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IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND STUDENTS’
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
JASON P. NANCE*
Tragic acts of school violence such as what occurred in Columbine, Newtown, and,
more recently, in Parkland and Santa Fe, provoke intense feelings of anger, fear,
sadness, and helplessness. Understandably, in response to these incidents (and for
other reasons), many schools have intensified the manner in which they monitor and
control students. Some schools rely on combinations of security measures such as
metal detectors; surveillance cameras; drug-sniffing dogs; locked and monitored
gates; random searches of students’ belongings, lockers, and persons; and law
enforcement officers. Not only is there little empirical evidence that these measures
actually make schools safer, but overreliance on extreme security measures can
create prisonlike environments that are inconsistent with students’ best interests.
Specifically, overreliance on intense surveillance measures often engenders distrust
and discord among members of the school community in the long term, leading to
increased disorder and dysfunction. Extreme security measures also play a role in
pushing more students out of school and into the criminal justice system, which can
have devastating consequences on students and their families.
Although all schools do and should monitor students to some extent, empirical
evidence demonstrates that not all students experience these intense, prisonlike
conditions. Rather, schools serving higher concentrations of students of color are
more likely to rely on coercive surveillance measures than schools serving primarily
white students. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that legitimate safety concerns
do not fully explain these racial disparities, but that implicit racial bias influences
school officials’ decisions to rely on intense surveillance methods to some degree.
Indeed, empirical studies repeatedly document that many people unconsciously and
unfairly associate minorities, particularly African Americans, with aggression,
violence, crime, and danger.
Recognizing that our current constitutional jurisprudence establishes prime
conditions for these racial disparities to develop, this Article proposes a
reformulated legal framework to evaluate the constitutionality of coercive
surveillance methods that is firmly grounded in the U.S. Supreme Court’s current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Applying this reformulated framework in
connection with other strategies will ameliorate the effects of implicit racial bias,

*. Professor of Law and University Term Professor, University of Florida Levin College
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Ph.D., M.A., Educational
Administration, The Ohio State University. I would like to thank the following individuals for
the helpful feedback and assistance they provided for this Article: Barry Feld, Darren
Hutchinson, Sharon Rush, Terry Smith, and Michael Allan Wolf. I also appreciate the helpful
comments provided by faculty members and conference participants during presentations of
earlier versions of this work at the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the
Humanities Twentieth Annual Conference at Stanford University School of Law; the
University of Florida Levin College of Law’s Internal Faculty Workshop Series; the 2017
International Meeting on Law and Society; and the 2017 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Annual Conference. Finally, I am also grateful for the excellent research assistance I
received from Samanta Franchim, Anthony Kakoyannis, Laura Liles, and Sara Salem.

48

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:47

help address the disproportionate application of coercive security measures on
students of color, and motivate school officials working in majority-minority schools
to rely on alternative, evidence-based methods to enhance school safety without
harming the learning climate.

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 48
I. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ..................................................................................... 54
A. THE SCIENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS .............................................................. 55
B. THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST .......................................................... 58
C. EVIDENCE OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND ITS EFFECTS ......................... 60
D. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND RACIAL SPACES .......................................... 63
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE UNEQUAL
APPLICATION OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES .................................... 65
A. 2009–2010 SSOCS STUDY..................................................................... 65
B. 2013–2014 SSOCS STUDY..................................................................... 68
C. OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES ................................................................... 68
III. HARMS OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES .............................................. 73
A. OVERRELIANCE ON INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES HARMS
STUDENTS’ INTERESTS ........................................................................... 74
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE
MEASURES IS UNCLEAR.......................................................................... 78
C. THE UNEQUAL USE OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES ON STUDENTS
OF COLOR IS PARTICULARLY HARMFUL ................................................. 84
IV. THE CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE GOVERNING THE EVALUATION
OF SURVEILLANCE MEASURES IN SCHOOLS ..................................................... 86
V. A REFORMULATED FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK ................................. 92
A. RETHINK THE CONCEPT OF “NATURE AND IMMEDIACY OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL CONCERN” .................................................................. 95
B. RETHINK THE CONCEPT OF “INTRUSION” ............................................... 98
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 102

INTRODUCTION1
Deadly acts of school violence such as those that occurred in Columbine,
Newtown, and, most recently, in Parkland and Santa Fe cause strong feelings of

1. This Article builds upon my prior works on student surveillance, racial inequalities,
and implicit racial bias, particularly Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of
Students’ Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367
(2013) [hereinafter Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches]; Jason P. Nance, School
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79 (2014) [hereinafter Nance,
School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment]; Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and
Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race]; and Jason P.
Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765
(2017) [hereinafter Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial
Bias]. To fully understand the significance of the empirical analyses, theories, and proposals
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outrage, fear, sadness, perplexity, and helplessness.2 In response to these tragedies,
and for other reasons,3 many schools have attempted to create a more orderly and
safe environment by intensifying the manner in which they monitor and control
students.4 It is not uncommon for school authorities to require students to regularly
pass through metal detectors,5 have fully uniformed police officers run metaldetector wands around students’ frames, 6 install surveillance cameras,7 rely on drugsniffing dogs,8 require students to wear identification badges,9 control access to
school campuses by locking or monitoring gates, 10 conduct random searches of
students’ personal belongings, lockers, and persons, 11 and have police officers patrol
school hallways and grounds.12 School officials should ensure that students are
monitored to some degree to promote a safe learning environment. However, not
only is there very little empirical evidence that these measures actually make schools
safer,13 there comes a point when monitoring and controlling students no longer
fosters a positive learning climate but instead significantly impairs it. 14 This is

for reform I provide in this Article, I summarize, highlight, and draw upon certain material
discussed in my prior works for the reader’s convenience.
2. See Jennifer Agiesta & Tom Raum, Poll: Rage over Newtown School Shooting Tops
9/11, POST-STAR (Jan 16, 2013), https://poststar.com/news/poll-rage-over-newtown-school
-shooting-tops/article_52b10ff6-6061-11e2-936d-001a4bcf887a.html
[https://perma.cc
/BDF4-QKBV]; Britt Kennerly, How To Talk to Your Kids About Mass Shootings, USA
TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/02/15/tips
-talk-kids-shootings/341735002/ [https://perma.cc/3TLK-JNR5].
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in America: Disparate and Unequal, in
SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 38, 39 (Torin
Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2010); AARON KUPCHIK, THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY
PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 11–12 (2016);
Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919,
929–36 (2016).
5. See INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES, PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE:
2013–14, at 5 (2015).
6. See id.
7. Id.; see also Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings, supra
note 1, at 409.
8. Institute of Education Sciences, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 5.
11. See, e.g., id. (documenting nationally the percentage of schools that have conducted
“random sweeps for contraband”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349,
351–53 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing a school district’s practice of searching through students’
belongings); Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103–04 (D. Minn. 2009)
(describing a school’s practice of conducting random suspicionless searches through students
belongings and persons); In re T.A.S., 713 S.E.2d 211, 212 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining
that students were required to pass through metal detectors during which time their backpacks,
purses, and coats were also searched).
12. Institute of Education Sciences, supra note 5, at 5.
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra
note 1, at 768–69.
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particularly true when school officials rely on a combination of these coercive
measures to monitor students, which can result in the creation of a prisonlike
environment for students.
For example, a large school district in Los Angeles has a search policy mandating
that teachers and school staff members at each of its 900 schools conduct
suspicionless searches of their students at various points of the day, including during
class time.15 A student described his experience with this policy in the following
manner.16 He said that while he and his classmates were taking notes in his middle
school English class, police officers interrupted the class and announced that they
were conducting a random search for drugs. 17 The police officers looked around the
classroom and said that they wanted to search the “three black kids back there.” 18
The officers pulled these students out into the hallway, forced them to spread their
arms out, and began conducting the searches.19 A police officer asked one student to
open up his backpack. As the student began to comply, the police officer grabbed the
backpack out of his hands and dumped its contents onto the ground. A police officer
told another student to take off his shirt and his shoes. At first this student simply
lifted his shirt up because he was uncomfortable with the police officer’s demands.
But then the police officer forcibly pulled up this student’s shirt and conducted his
search. When asked how this ordeal made him feel, the student who was interviewed
replied, “[I]t made me not care about school . . . . I didn’t want to feel or be the person
they try to make me be, and that’s a criminal. . . . We are students, not suspects.”20
Another student, Elizabeth Perea, a high school junior, described her experience
this way.21 In the middle of class, a school official entered the classroom to randomly
select students to be searched in front of all the other students.22 Elizabeth continued:
We were told to face the blackboard. [The school official] told us to lift
up our arms and open our legs. She patted down our pockets, ankles, and
pant legs. She told us to untuck our shirts and to turn around. Nobody
found anything on any of the students. Nobody explained why they were
searching us. Instead, we each received a note afterwards explaining that
we had been searched.23

15. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICY BULLETIN, ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES TO ENSURE SCHOOL SAFETY 2 (2015), https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BUL-5424.2-ADMINISTRATIVE-SEARCHES-TO
-ENSURE-SCHOOL-SAFETY-w-attach.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK7U-WYB2].
16. See Students Not Suspects, ACLU S. CAL., https://www.aclusocal.org/en/campaigns
/students-not-suspects [https://perma.cc/78PJ-VZ92].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ACLU of Southern California Sues To Stop Intrusive Searches at High School, ACLU
(June 19, 2001), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-southern-california-sues-stop-intrusive
-searches-high-school [https://perma.cc/P9PZ-TKC2].
22. Id.
23. Id.
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According to Elizabeth, these searches humiliate and embarrass the students. 24 “It is
absurd. We try to stay away from violence and gangs, and either way we are treated
like gangbangers. They should not search us during our education time. Plus, girls
have private things in our bags . . . and that shouldn’t be shown for everyone to see.”25
Even worse, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, these policies are not
applied uniformly.26 Rather, the ACLU’s review of the school district’s search logs
shows that schools with higher concentrations of low-income students or students of
color implement the search policy much more frequently than schools with lower
concentrations of low-income students or students of color.27
Minerva Dickson, a student attending high school in New York City, lamented
that the first time she saw her high school, it reminded her of a prison.28 Each day
when she arrived at school, she waited in a long line to slide her identification card
through a machine.29 Then she would head to the metal detectors, where she would
find several police officers with handcuffs dangling from their belts waiting for her.30
While the police officers were watching, Minerva would remove her shoes, hairpins,
and jewelry; put her backpack and purse on the conveyer belt to be scanned; and wait
for a police officer to signal her to come forward.31 Another police officer then would
run a metal detector scanner around her tiny frame as she stood with her arms and
legs spread out.32 When the police officer finished, she would hurriedly gather her
belongings, put her shoes back on, and rush to her first class. 33 When asked about
how these experiences made her feel, she replied, “They treat[] us like criminals. It
ma[kes] me hate school. When you cage up students like that it doesn’t make us safe,
it makes things worse.”34
Edward Ward, who attended high school in the west side of Chicago, also
described his school experience as prisonlike.35 Ninety percent of the students
attending Edward’s school were low-income students, and all of the students were
students of color.36 Edward recalled:

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Letter from Victor Leung, ACLU of S. Cal. & Ruth Cusick, Public Council, to
Michelle King, Superintendent of L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. 6 (Feb. 24, 2016),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2016-02-23
-ACLU-PC-Re-Metal-Detector-Search.pdf [https://perma.cc/72M9-WRLA].
27. Id.
28. Perps or Pupils? Safety Policy Creates Prison-like New York City Schools, JUVENILE
JUSTICE INFO. EXCH. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://jjie.org/york-story/93676/ [https://
perma.cc/8AH7-H7YS].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights & Human Rights, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (testimony of
Edward
Ward),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12
-12WardTestimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WEH-2V3S].
36. Id. at 1–2.

52

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:47

From the moment we stepped through the doors in the morning, we were
faced with metal detectors, x-ray machines and uniformed security. Upon
entering the school, it was like we stepped into a prison. . . . [T]he halls
were full with school security officers whose only purpose seemed to be
to serve students with detentions or suspensions. 37
Edward observed that attending school in this tense surveillance environment that
focused primarily on confinement and control had a profound negative effect on him
and his classmates. He stated that he “could slowly see the determination to get an
education fade from the faces of [his] peers because they were convinced that they
no longer mattered.”38
Overreliance on extreme surveillance measures can harm students’ interests in at
least two ways. First, coercive security measures contribute to the formation of
dysfunctional learning environments that lead to poor student outcomes. 39
Substantial research indicates that coercive security measures often engender
distrust, discord, and disunity among members of the school community, which often
leads to higher levels of dissatisfaction, disorder, and dysfunction in the long term.40
Second, the use of extreme surveillance measures often leads to higher levels of
student exclusion and student involvement with the criminal justice system.41 When
schools rely on intense surveillance tactics in connection with other extreme
disciplinary measures, such as zero tolerance policies, to control school
environments, schools end up pushing more students out of school and into the
criminal justice system, which has devastating consequences on students, their
families, and our nation.42
Intense surveillance climates can exist in all types of schools, but this normally is
not the case. Critically, substantial empirical evidence demonstrates that schools
serving higher concentrations of students of color are more likely to rely on coercive
surveillance measures than schools serving primarily white students.43 Furthermore,

37. Id. at 1–3.
38. Id. at 3.
39. See Thomas Mowen, John Brent & Aaron Kupchik, School Crime and Safety, in THE
HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 434, 443 (Beth
M. Huebner & Timothy S. Bynum eds., 2016).
40. See Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the
Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 340 (2003);
Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence and Disruption:
Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 333, 350, 352 (1999).
41. See Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra
note 1, at 788–92.
42. Id. “Zero tolerance” policies require the application of certain consequences, usually
severe in nature, for engaging in certain type of activities regardless of the surrounding
circumstances or seriousness of the behavior. See Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance
Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 852 (2008); see also infra Section III.A.
43. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 27–41; Nance, Student
Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 1, at 805–11; Jeremy
D. Finn & Timothy J. Servoss, Security Measures and Discipline in American High Schools,
in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 44,
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these racial disparities remain even after accounting for other factors that might
explain why some school officials choose to rely on intense surveillance measures
and others do not, including the level of crime that occurs on school grounds, the
amount of student misbehavior and school disorder, and the level of crime that exists
in the neighborhood in which the school resides.44
These empirical findings suggest that legitimate safety concerns do not fully
explain the disparate use of intense surveillance measures among students of color,
but that implicit racial bias influences school officials’ decisions to some degree.
Empirical studies repeatedly confirm that many individuals unconsciously and
unfairly associate minorities, particularly African Americans, with violence, crime,
aggression, and danger.45 In fact, the science of implicit racial bias provides a
compelling explanation for how some school officials can seemingly act in good faith
and without a conscious intent to racially discriminate, yet unknowingly create and
perpetuate racial inequalities by making decisions that harm students of color based
on unconscious stereotypes and attitudes. 46
Educators and policymakers themselves can and should lead the reform
movement to address the unequal application of coercive security measures on
students of color. Indeed, there are much more effective methods to create safe,
orderly learning environments than relying on oppressive surveillance measures. 47
The judiciary also has a critical role to play, especially when school officials are
unaware of, apathetic towards, or even resistant to the need for change.
This Article goes beyond the current literature by proposing a new legal
framework for evaluating intense surveillance methods in schools. Importantly, this
framework seeks to ameliorate the pernicious effects of implicit racial bias in school
officials’ decision-making where the majority of students they serve are students of
color. This proposed test does not rely on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, which requires independent evidence, other than disproportionate
impact, that government officials acted with a discriminatory racial intent when
making a decision.48 Instead, this framework centers on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
current jurisprudence evaluating students’ Fourth Amendment rights.
It is important to emphasize that this reformulated framework does not require a
complete overhaul of current Fourth Amendment case law. Rather, this framework

49 (Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015).
44. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 27–41; Nance, Student
Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 1, at 823–31.
45. See infra Part I.
46. See Patricia G. Devine, Patrick S. Forscher, Anthony J. Austin & William T.L. Cox,
Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1267 (2012) (observing that many theorists maintain the
implicit racial bias explains the paradox behind persistent racial inequalities amid a general
improvement of racial attitudes); Sarah Redfield, Can New Thinking Help Reverse the Schoolto-Prison Pipeline?, 5 A.B.A. DIVERSITY VOICE, Summer 2014, at 4.
47. See Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 345–71 (2016).
48. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (stating
that although disparate impact “may provide an important starting point . . . impact alone is
not determinative”).
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is firmly grounded within the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. It is only a matter of expanding lower courts’ understanding of the
current factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has established to evaluate students’
Fourth Amendment rights in light of current realities that many students face. Said
another way, this framework requires only a modest recalibration, but one necessary
to correct for the illegitimate role that implicit racial bias can play in school officials’
decisions to adopt harsh surveillance measures. And while lawmakers, courts,
educators, community members, parents, and the students themselves must do much
more to create equitable and inclusive school environments for students of all races,
ethnicities, and backgrounds, this proposed framework will help move our nation
closer to achieving this important goal.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the science of implicit racial
bias and how this cognitive bias can influence school officials’ decisions to adopt
extreme surveillance measures based on the concentration of minority students at
school. Part II presents the results of several empirical analyses revealing the
disparate use of coercive security measures along racial lines, even after accounting
for other factors that might explain these disparities, such as neighborhood crime,
school crime, and overall levels of disorder within the school, suggesting that implicit
racial bias influences school officials’ decisions to employ intense surveillance
measures to some degree. Part III discusses the social and pedagogical harms that
result from the overreliance of coercive surveillance measures in schools. It also
discusses the particular harms associated with the disproportionate use of these
measures on students of color. Part IV discusses the development of Fourth
Amendment law that courts currently employ to evaluate surveillance measures in
schools. It demonstrates that the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides
school officials with almost unbounded discretion to employ a variety of intense
security measures, even when schools do not face legitimate safety concerns, and
thereby establishes prime conditions for implicit racial bias to unduly influence
school officials’ decision-making. Part V proposes a reformulated framework to
evaluate the constitutionality of suspicionless searches of students that is rooted in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Applying this
new framework will help counteract the ill effects of implicit racial bias, ameliorate
the disproportionate application of intense surveillance measures on students of
color, and foster more equitable and inclusive school environments for all students.
I. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
Several decades of scientific research shows that human judgment can be deeply
affected by a multitude of biases. 49 This is particularly true when a person lacks
sufficient information to make a sound judgment, is inundated with information, is
under time pressure to make a decision, or has substantial discretion.50 This Part will
describe the science of implicit racial bias, discuss a sophisticated technique for
measuring implicit racial bias called the implicit association test, and present

49. See infra Section I.A.
50. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2628 (2013).
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empirical evidence of the pernicious effects of implicit racial bias, including in
school settings. It will also explain how “racial spaces,” where not all individuals are
minorities, but the majority are, can trigger implicit racial biases and unduly
influence decision-making.
A. The Science of Implicit Bias
Our understanding of human cognitive processes has increased significantly over
the last three decades, particularly in the area of implicit social cognition. 51 Implicit
social cognition science, which underpins the theory of implicit racial bias, examines
cognitive processes that operate outside of our conscious awareness and volitional
control.52 Substantial empirical research demonstrates that human attitudes,
perceptions, decision-making, and behaviors are influenced by factors beyond
human conscious awareness or intention.53
Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman established a widely accepted and useful
framework for understanding human cognition. 54 Kahneman divided human
cognition processing systems into two categories: System 1 and System 2. 55 System
2 processing is best described as conscious processing. 56 It requires substantial
working memory and is reflective, slow, controlled, deliberate, rule-based, and

51. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); ZIVA KUNDA,
SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup
Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.
143, 144 (2004) (describing the development of implicit bias theory).
52. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”:
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 35
(2014); Brian A. Nosek, Carlee Beth Hawkins & Rebecca S. Frazier, Implicit Social
Cognition: From Measures to Mechanisms, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 152, 152 (2011); L.
Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1146
(2012).
53. See KUNDA, supra note 51, at 266; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006); Kristin A. Lane,
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 427, 428 (2007).
54. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 3–105.
55. See id. at 20–21. Other scientists and researchers have described the duel system of
information processing. See, e.g., Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith E. Stanovich, DuelProcess Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 223 (2013). Some scientists and researchers refer to the duel system of information
processing using other terms. See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflexive and Reflective
Judgment Processes: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS:
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 44, 46–47 (Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams &
William Von Hippel eds., 2003) (describing reflexive processes and reflective processes). Not
all duel process theories are alike, see Evans & Stanovich, supra, at 226–27, and scientists are
still trying to identify whether there are indeed two cognitive systems, more than two systems,
or simply one system with multiple processes, see Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke & Steve Leben,
Minding the Court: Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, 5 INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN., Feb.
2013, at 1 n.6.
56. KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 21.
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correlated with cognitive ability. 57 In contrast, System 1 processing is quick,
automatic, contextualized, associative, independent of cognitive ability, involuntary,
and operates mostly outside of a person’s conscious awareness. 58 This type of
processing is critical for humans because it helps a person process information
quickly in a fast-paced, complex world without expending valuable mental
resources.59
System 1 processing helps humans quickly understand their environment and
make decisions through automatic associations between objects and concepts.60 For
example, individuals often associate concepts and objects such as “menu,” “prices,”
“food,” and “restaurant” quickly, automatically, and effortlessly because they are
frequently linked together.61 Importantly, not only do humans rely on System 1
processing to make automatic associations between objects and concepts but they
also use it to make automatic associations between people and concepts. 62 These
associations may occur along with a number of identities that one perceives in
another person, such as race, gender, age, or disability status. 63
Implicit racial biases are subconscious associations made about a racial group
using System 1 processing.64 Specifically, implicit racial bias theory posits that
humans make implicit racial associations (1) involuntarily, as they occur
automatically in response to various environmental factors and cues; (2)
unintentionally, as they are not deliberate responses to perceptions or information
that humans confront; and (3) effortlessly, as this cognitive processing does not affect
humans’ ability to consciously process information. 65 Essentially, these implicit
racial associations help humans to “manage information overload and make
decisions more efficiently and easily” by “filtering information, filling in missing
data, and automatically categorizing people according to cultural stereotypes.” 66

57. See id. (“System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it,
including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.”); see also Evans & Stanovich,
supra note 55, at 223–25.
58. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 20 (“System 1 operates automatically and quickly,
with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.”); Evans & Stanovich, supra note 55,
at 223–25.
59. Casey et al., supra note 55, at 5–6; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1499 (2005); Kent McIntosh, Erik J. Girvan, Robert H. Horner & Keith
Smolkowski, Education Not Incarceration: A Conceptual Model for Reducing Racial and
Ethnic Disproportionality in School Discipline, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD., Issue 2, Article
4, 2014, at 7.
60. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2629.
61. Id. at 2629.
62. See id. at 2630; Kang, supra note 59, at 1499.
63. See Cheryl Staats, Understanding Implicit Bias: What Educators Should Know, 39
AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2015–2016, at 30.
64. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2629.
65. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 485 (2004).
66. Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2629 (quoting Graham and Lowery, supra note
65, at 485).
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Unconscious stereotypes and attitudes towards certain racial groups are the
driving forces behind implicit racial bias.67 A stereotype is defined as “a socially
shared set of beliefs about traits that are characteristic of members of a social
category.”68 A stereotype can encompass views and beliefs with “widely diverging
evaluative implications” and may unduly and unfairly influence actions and
decisions to the degree that an individual behaves towards another person as if that
person possesses the traits embodied in the stereotype. 69 Attitudes, on the other hand,
are favorable or unfavorable dispositions towards concepts (such as a social group). 70
A person develops attitudes from past experiences, and those experiences inform and
influence future preferences and behavior.71 Stereotypes and attitudes are related, but
distinct.72 For example, one may associate Asian Americans with high achievement
in mathematics but still feel negatively towards this racial group.73 Likewise, one can
feel positively towards African Americans but still associate them with weapons. 74
Humans develop unconscious attitudes and stereotypes from repeated exposure to
associations between certain racial groups and various concepts and traits.75 For
example, those living in the United States are repeatedly exposed to associations
between African Americans and danger, violence, and aggression. 76 In fact, some
scholars posit that because African Americans are so commonly associated with
negative traits, we unconsciously tend to associate African Americans with anything
negative.77
Critically, empirical research confirms that individuals often harbor implicit
attitudes and stereotypes about certain racial groups that are inconsistent with their
explicitly endorsed attitudes, beliefs, and principles.78 Accordingly, implicit attitudes
and stereotypes can negatively influence judgment and decision-making in ways that
individuals are unaware of, unable to control, or disagree with explicitly, even when
individuals strive to be fair minded.79 This poses challenging problems under our
current legal discrimination frameworks because although implicit racial bias often
leads to observable, measurable discriminatory behavior, discrimination doctrine is

67. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 951.
68. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 14 (1995).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7; see also Jerry Kang, Judge Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey,
Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthody G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson
& Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012).
71. Hutchinson, supra note 52, at 35.
72. Kang et al., supra note 70, at 1128–29.
73. Id. at 1129.
74. Id.
75. Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2630.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2630; Kelly Welch, The Effect of Minority Threat on Risk Management and the
“New Disciplinology” in Schools, J. CRIM. JUST., 2017, at 3.
78. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 951; Hutchinson, supra note 52, at 316;
Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009).
79. See Casey et al., supra note 55, at 10; Kang, supra note 59, at 1514.
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based on assumptions that individuals make decisions according to their explicit
attitudes, beliefs, and intentions.80
Importantly, implicit biases, including implicit racial biases, tend to manifest
themselves most acutely in certain situations. For example, as Jerry Kang and his
colleagues explained, “the conditions under which implicit biases translate most
readily into discriminatory behavior are when people have wide discretion in making
quick decisions with little accountability.” 81 They also tend to manifest themselves
more acutely when structural demands exceed capacity to make reasoned decisions,
such as when situations are unclear, ambiguous, and difficult to fully understand, and
when individuals’ cognitive resources are strained or limited, such as when
individuals are operating under stress or feeling fatigued.82
B. The Implicit Association Test
Cognitive psychologists have developed sophisticated methods for measuring
implicit biases. The most established and widely recognized measure is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT).83 The IAT measures the strength of association between
concepts that underlie implicit attitudes and stereotypes. 84 The Race IAT, which is
the most widely used IAT, measures implicit racial bias towards African
Americans.85 It asks participants to perform a series of tasks. First, it asks participants
to sort white faces and African American faces by pressing computer keys on the
right side and left side of the keyboard as they appear on the computer screen.86
Second, it asks participants to distinguish between unpleasant and pleasant words,
again by pressing keys on the left side and right side of the keyboard. 87 The next two
tasks, in random order, involve faces of African Americans and whites and pleasant

80. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 951.
81. Kang et al., supra note 70, at 1142; Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2628.
82. See McIntosh et al., supra note 59, at 6 (“[I]ndividuals’ implicit biases are more likely
to affect their decisions when the structural demands of a situation exceed the available
information (e.g. judgments that are inherently difficult, subjective, or ambiguous), or when
cognitive resources are limited (e.g. when decisions must be made quickly or individuals are
physically or mentally fatigued).” (footnotes omitted)); Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at
2628.
83. See Kang, supra note 59, at 1509 (“The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has become
the state-of-the-art measurement tool.”); Kristen A. Lane, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Brian A. Nosek
& Anthony G. Greenwald, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV, in
IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59, 65 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007)
(discussing how the IAT test has been employed in social cognition, clinical settings,
marketing, developmental settings, health, law, disorders, and to measures attitudes toward
death, nature, celebrities, foods, cities, geography, public opinion issues, and politics).
84. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES
OF GOOD PEOPLE 39 (2013); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 952.
85. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 952. Other IAT tests measure biases towards
Native Americans, age, disability, religion, sexuality, gender, weight, Asians, skin tone, and
Arab-Muslims, among others. See Take a Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu
/implicit/selectatest.html [https://perma.cc/XY5C-7C52].
86. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 53, at 952.
87. Id.
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and unpleasant words.88 In one of these tasks, the Race IAT asks participants to press
one key when they view a white face or an unpleasant word and another key when
they view an African American face or a pleasant word.89 In the next task, it requests
participants to press one key when they view an African American face or an
unpleasant word and another key when they view a white face or a pleasant word. 90
The implicit attitude measure is determined by the comparative accuracy and speed
of completing these tasks.91
Two important findings have emerged from the IAT. 92 First, based on the
responses of millions of individuals who have taken the Race IAT,93 almost seventyfive percent of the test takers, which includes African American test takers, have an
implicit bias against African Americans.94 Second, although some have criticized
implicit bias theory and the IAT,95 empirical evidence repeatedly confirms that white
preference measured by the Race IAT successfully predicts discriminatory behavior,
even among persons who claim to be egalitarians. 96 Anthony Greenwald and his
colleagues performed a meta-analysis of 122 research studies of implicit bias that
included 184 independent samples and 14,900 research subjects. 97 Their study
substantiated considerable support for the predictive validity of the IAT.98

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 953; see also BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 42.
92. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 47.
93. See The IAT, BLINDSPOT, http://blindspot.fas.harvard.edu/IAT [https://perma.cc
/5YZN-RB8T].
94. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 47; see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 78,
at 1199. African Americans’ pattern of preferences differs from other racial groups. Overall,
they exhibit slight implicit preferences for whites, but they have more variability in their
responses. Furthermore, some African Americans express moderate to strong preferences for
African Americans, a preference rarely exhibited by whites. See Rachlinski et al., supra note
78, at 1199–2000.
95. See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would
Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?”, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 266–67
(2004); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1033–34 (2006); Frederick L. Oswald, Gregory Mitchell,
Hart Blanton, James Jaccard & Philip E. Tetlock, Predicting Ethnic and Racial
Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 171, 175 (2013).
96. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 47.
97. Anthony Greenwald, T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Lewis Uhlmann & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of
Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009).
98. See also Rachlinski et al., supra note 78, at 1201 (“The prevailing wisdom is that IAT
scores reveal implicit or unconscious bias.”); Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo, Field
Experiments on Discrimination 30–34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22014, 2016) (discussing the utility of the IAT after reviewing the literature on the predictive
value of the IAT). See generally Greenwald et al., supra note 97.
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C. Evidence of Implicit Racial Bias and Its Effects
Empirical studies repeatedly document that many people unconsciously and
unfairly associate minorities, particularly African Americans, with aggression,
violence, criminality, and danger.99 In fact, scholars observe that the association
between African Americans and crime and violence is so strong and common that it
is essentially bidirectional.100 That is, thoughts of crime and violence unconsciously
trigger thoughts of African Americans, and thoughts of African Americans
unconsciously trigger thoughts of crime and violence. 101 Critically, empirical
research also confirms that once implicit racial biases are triggered, they influence
human judgment, decisions, and actions in measurable ways. 102 Furthermore,
empirical research demonstrates that racial cues, such as skin color or even names
that are associated with certain racial groups, activate implicit racial biases and affect
decision-making.103
For example, Joshua Correll and his colleagues created a videogame where
African Americans and whites appeared in several different backgrounds holding a
gun or a different object such as a cell phone, camera, wallet, or aluminum can. 104
The researchers discovered that both white participants and African American
participants fired more quickly at armed African American targets and determined
more quickly not to shoot unarmed white targets. 105 When the researchers imposed a
time limit and offered financial incentives for correct responses, they found that both
white and African American participants were more likely to exhibit “shooter bias”
towards African American targets by more often erroneously (1) shooting at unarmed
African American targets than at unarmed white targets and (2) refraining from
shooting at armed white targets than at armed African American targets.106 The
researchers also asked a series of questions to gauge participants’ awareness of
various stereotypes of African Americans in American culture and their personal
endorsement of those stereotypes.107 They discovered that shooter biases were not

99. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876
(2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by
social psychologists for almost 60 years.”); see also Richardson, supra note 52, at 1147; Kelly
Welch, Allison Ann Payne, Ted Chiricos & Marc Gertz, The Typification of Hispanics As
Criminals and Support for Punitive Crime Control Policies, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 822, 823 (2011)
(describing the close association that Americans make between Hispanics and criminality);
Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Latino/a Student Threat and School Disciplinary Policies
and Practices, 91 SOC. EDUC. 91, 93 (2018) (explaining that crime, threat, and punishment are
closely associated with race and ethnicity, including Latinos).
100. Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2630.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2631.
103. Id. at 2630–31.
104. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd Wittenbrink, The Police
Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315 (2002).
105. Id. at 1317.
106. Id. at 1319.
107. Id. at 1321.
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associated with personally held stereotypes but were strongly associated with
awareness of cultural stereotypes.108
In another example, Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery conducted experiments
assessing police officers’ and juvenile probation officers’ reactions to stories about
hypothetical youth who allegedly committed crimes.109 Before any questions were
asked, participants were subliminally exposed to words on a screen relating either to
African Americans or to words neutral to ethnicity and race. 110 The experimenters
did not disclose the race of the youth who allegedly committed a crime, and the
causes of the crime were unclear.111 The experimenters then asked the participants to
assess the youth’s level of culpability, expected recidivism, deserved punishment,
hostility, and age.112 They found that racial priming influenced the officers’
judgments about offenders’ negative traits, deserved punishment, culpability, age,
and likely recidivism of the hypothetical offender, yet their consciously held beliefs
and attitudes about race were not related to their judgments.113
In yet another example, Frank Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar asked one group of
participants to watch a news story featuring an alleged perpetrator who was an
African American male and another group to watch the exact same news story except
that the alleged perpetrator was a white male. 114 The pictures of the alleged
perpetrators were equivalent in every respect except for skin color.115 Strikingly, the
experimenters found that when the alleged perpetrator was African American,
participants more strongly favored punitive policies to address the situation that
unfolded before them.116

108. Id. at 1322; see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic
and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
181, 185, 188 (2001) (finding that participants identified guns faster when they were primed
by seeing African American faces, identified tools faster when primed by seeing a white face,
and more often falsely identified tools as guns when primed by seeing African American
faces).
109. Graham & Lowery, supra note 65, at 487.
110. Id. at 489.
111. Id. at 487.
112. Id. at 487, 496.
113. Id. at 494, 497, 499.
114. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563 (2000).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 567–68. The studies discussed here represent only a small sample of the robust
research demonstrating individuals unconsciously associate African Americans with
aggression, violence, criminality, and danger. See, e.g., Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social
Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping
of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 595 (1976) (finding that when, following a
script, one white man shoved another white man, only thirteen percent of viewers thought that
this act was aggressive; but when both men were black, following the same script, that number
rose to sixty-nine percent); Eberhardt et al., supra note 99, at 876 (showing that participants
who were subliminally primed with crime-relevant objects induced attentional biases towards
African American faces); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social
Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 342 (2004) (demonstrating that implicit bias towards African Americans, not explicit bias,
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Not only have researchers measured implicit biases against minorities among
police officers,117 physicians,118 judges,119 and the general public,120 but controlled
experiments confirm the existence and effects of educators’ implicit biases against
minorities in school settings as well. For example, Jason Okonofua and Jennifer
Eberhardt conducted several controlled experiments to evaluate how race influences
teachers’ responses to student misbehavior.121 The experimenters displayed to
teachers a fictitious record of a student who misbehaved twice—once for
“insubordination” and the other for a “class disturbance.” 122 The researchers
manipulated student race by using stereotypical white names (Jake or Greg) or
African American names (Deshawn or Darnell).123 The experimenters then asked
several questions to assess the influence of race on teachers’ responses to the
student’s minor infractions. 124 The questions evaluated teachers’ irritation towards
the student, teachers’ perceptions of severity of the student’s misbehavior, how likely
teachers were to label the student as a “troublemaker,” and how severely teachers
believed that the student should be punished. 125 The experimenters found that the
teachers were “significantly more troubled” by the second school rule violation when
the student was African American than when the student was white. 126 In addition,
after the second infraction, teachers felt that the African American student should be
disciplined more harshly than the white student. 127 Furthermore, after the second
infraction by the African American student, teachers were more likely to label him
as a “troublemaker,” believe that the misbehavior was indicative of a negative

was more strongly related with a tendency to categorize racially ambiguous faces of African
Americans as hostile).
117. See, e.g., Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Bernd Wittenbrink &
Melody S. Sadler, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision
To Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020–22 (2007) (empirically finding
when the targets were African Americans, police officers manifested “robust racial bias in the
speed with which they made shoot/don’t-shoot decisions”).
118. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H. Ngo, Kristal
L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231, 1235–37 (2007); Janice A. Sabin, Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald & Frederick
P. Rivara, Physicians’ Implicit and Explicit Attitudes About Race by MD Race, Ethnicity, and
Gender, 20 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 896, 901 (2009) (empirically
demonstrating that the medical doctors participating in the study exhibited an overall strong
implicit preference for whites over African Americans).
119. See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., supra note 78, at 1210 (empirically finding “strong white
preference among the white judges”).
120. See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 47.
121. Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining
of Young Students, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 617, 617 (2015).
122. Id. at 618. The researchers counterbalanced the order in which they displayed the
infractions across participants. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 619.
127. Id.
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pattern, and imagine suspending this student in the future. 128 This study is consistent
with other empirical studies, though not controlled, which demonstrate that students
of color often receive more frequent and harsher punishment than similarly situated
white students.129
D. Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Spaces
The empirical research discussed above documents the existence of implicit racial
biases and their detrimental effects on minorities in a variety of contexts, including
schools. While certainly not the only factor causing racial disparities in the education
context, implicit racial bias may contribute to some extent to the racial disparities
that persist across the areas of academic achievement, discipline, grade retention, and
placement in special education.130 Importantly, implicit racial bias may also
contribute to some degree to racial disparities relating to the use of intense
surveillance measures,131 even when not all of the students at a school are students
of color.
Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush conducted an important empirical
study that illuminates the connection between implicit racial biases and “racial
spaces” such as neighborhoods or schools.132 Sampson and Raudenbush measured
how individuals perceive disorder in neighborhoods, then compared those
perceptions with “independent assessments of disorder that are reliable and
ecologically valid.”133 They theorized that the racial composition of the
neighborhood would influence individuals’ subjective perceptions of disorder in that
neighborhood.134 Evaluating census data, police data recording violent crimes, data
from personal interviews of neighborhood residents, and observations of city
streets,135 the researchers learned that the neighborhoods’ racial compositions of
African Americans and Latinos were stronger predictors of subjective disorder
perceived by neighborhood residents, including by African American residents, than
careful, actual observations of disorder.136 Importantly, the researchers replicated
these findings on an independent data set from community leaders who did not live
in the communities in which they worked, concluding that the racial composition of

128. Id. at 621; cf. Clifton A. Casteel, Teacher-Student Interactions and Race in Integrated
Classrooms, 92 J. EDUC. RES. 115, 119 (2001) (empirically finding that African American
students had more negative interactions with white teachers than white students did, and white
students had more positive interactions with teachers than African American students did);
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398–406 (2007) (demonstrating empirically that
participants misremembered more facts when listening to a story about “Tyronne” than
listening to the same story about “William”).
129. See infra notes 193–197 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part II.
132. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004).
133. Id. at 324.
134. Id. at 322–24.
135. Id. at 324–27.
136. Id. at 336.
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the neighborhoods more strongly predicted community leaders’ subjective
perceptions of disorder than careful, actual observations of disorder.137
Sampson and Raudenbush’s study was consistent with findings from two prior
studies. In the first study, Lincoln Quillian and Devah Pager examined Chicago,
Seattle, and Baltimore survey data, census data, and police crime statistics and found
that a neighborhood’s concentration of young, male African Americans was “one of
the best predictors of the perceived severity of neighborhood crime,” even after
controlling for other variables such as neighborhood deterioration, crime rates, and
victimization rates.138 They concluded that their findings “suggest that the strong
mental association between race and crime ha[ve] a powerful influence on
perceptions of neighborhood crime levels, beyond any actual association between
race and crime.”139 In the second study, researcher Joshua Correll and his colleagues
examined police officers’ inclinations to shoot or not shoot African American and
white targets.140 They found that implicit racial biases increased among police
officers serving in urban environments working with higher concentrations of
African American residents.141 As L. Song Richardson observes, “[O]fficers whose
primary experience is based on proactive policing in urban, poor, and majority-black
neighborhoods may have higher levels of implicit bias which can result in them being
less accurate than officers whose primary experience consists of work in other
neighborhoods.”142
These studies demonstrate that not only can the race of an individual person
trigger implicit biases but so can “racial spaces”—such as neighborhoods and
schools—where a significant number of minorities are present. Thus, even if not all
of the students in the school are minority students, working in a school serving high
concentrations of students of color still may unconsciously influence school officials’
perceptions, actions, behaviors, and decision-making regarding how to create orderly
learning environments, especially when school officials’ may unconsciously
associate minority students with danger, crime, aggression, disorder, and violence.143

137. Id.
138. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial
Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 747 (2001).
139. Id. at 748.
140. Correll et al., supra note 117, at 1006.
141. Id. at 1014.
142. Richardson, supra note 52, at 1160; cf. Timothy J. Servoss, School Security and
Student Misbehavior: A Multi-Level Examination, 49 YOUTH & SOC. 755, 772 (2014)
(demonstrating that teachers in high-security schools rated African American students as more
disruptive relative to their white peers and suggesting that teachers’ biases may be exacerbated
against African American students in higher security environments).
143. See Timothy J. Servoss & Jeremy D. Finn, School Security: For Whom and with What
Results?, 13 LEADERSHIP & POL’Y SCH. 61, 64 (2014) (explaining that as the proportion of
minorities in a school rises, school officials are more prone to rely on punitive discipline
methods to combat crime-related threats and to maintain dominance); Welch, supra note 77,
at 2 (“Because of the stereotype of blacks as criminals, school policymakers may sense a
greater risk that needs managing when schools are populated by proportionally larger numbers
of black students.”).
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II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE UNEQUAL APPLICATION
OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES
The disparate treatment of minority students has been documented repeatedly in
almost all areas of public education,144 and this appalling trend also pervades the area
of surveillance measures in schools. This Part will discuss several empirical studies
that demonstrate the disproportionate use of coercive surveillance measures on
minority students and highlight the role that implicit racial bias may play in school
officials’ decisions to implement such measures.
A. 2009–2010 SSOCS Study
In 2013, I empirically tested the hypothesis that schools with higher
concentrations of minority students were associated with greater odds of relying on
coercive surveillance measures than schools with lower concentrations of minority
students, even after controlling for other factors that might influence school officials’
decisions to implement these measures.145 To test this hypothesis, I analyzed
restricted data from the National Center for Educational Statistics’ (NCES) 146 2009–
2010 School Survey on Crime and Safety (2009–2010 SSOCS).147 The 2009–2010
SSOCS is a national dataset that contains information about school security practices,
school crime, school disorder, neighborhood crime, and student demographics from
approximately 2650 schools. 148

144. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 29–31 (2006); Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and
School Resources: What It Will Take To Close the Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING THE
OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD AN EVEN CHANCE 77,
77–91 (Prudence L. Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013) (describing the inequalities present
in our education system); Jason P. Nance, The Need and Justifications for a Stronger Federal
Response To Address Educational Inequalities, in THE ROAD TO PROGRESS: THE CASE FOR A
U.S. EDUCATION AMENDMENT (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds.,
forthcoming).
145. See Nance, Students, Security and Race, supra note 1, at 27–43, for a full description
of the study’s dataset, variables, results, as well as its limitations.
146. The NCES “is the primary federal entity for collecting and analyzing data related to
education in the U.S. and other nations. NCES is located within the U.S. Department of
Education and the Institute of Education Sciences.” About Us, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/5VJY-NPNB].
147. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SCHOOL SURVEY ON
CRIME AND SAFETY PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE: 2009–2010 SCHOOL YEAR [hereinafter 2009–
2010
SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE],
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010
_Questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGL4-4QZ7]; see also Nance, Students, Security, and
Race, supra note 1, at 28. The dataset I analyzed was the restricted-access version. Although
restricted datasets are available only to researchers who meet certain conditions, datasets
containing less sensitive data are available to the public. See School Survey on Crime and
Safety (SSOCS), NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp
[https://perma.cc/WRL2-VJ3U].
148. 2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 147.
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The 2009–2010 SSOCS asked school principals to answer several questions
relating to their school security practices. Principals responded whether “[d]uring the
2009–2010 school year . . . it [was] a practice of [their] school to”: “[r]equire students
to pass through metal detectors each day;” “[p]erform one or more random metal
detector checks on students;” “[p]erform one or more random sweeps for contraband
(e.g., drugs or weapons), but not including dog sniffs;” “[c]ontrol access to school
grounds during school hours (e.g., locked or monitored gates);” “[u]se one or more
security cameras to monitor the school;” and “have any security guards, security
personnel, or sworn law enforcement officers present at [the] school at least once a
week.”149 The dependent variables for my study represented the odds that a school
principal responded affirmatively to using various combinations of these surveillance
practices.150
To measure the effect of race and ethnicity, I included in my model the percentage
of minority students attending the schools. 151 I also included other student
demographic and characteristic information, such as student poverty, the percentage
of students with limited English proficiency, the percentage of students who scored
in the bottom fifteen percent on state standardized exams, and the percentage of
students enrolled in special education. 152
To account for other factors that might influence school officials’ decisions to rely
on intense surveillance measures, I controlled for school crime, school disorder, and
crime in the neighborhood in which the school resides. 153 Regarding school crime,
the 2009–2010 SSOCS asked school principals to report the number of incidents of
school crime by type that occurred at school or on school property during the school
year.154 To control for school disorder, I created an index based on responses to
various questions about student disciplinary problems. 155 With respect to

149. Id. at 5, 8.
150. I examined four different combinations of security practices: (1) metal detectors and
guards/school police; (2) metal detectors, guards/school police, and random sweeps for
contraband; (3) metal detectors, guards/school police, random sweeps for contraband, and
security cameras; and (4) metal detectors, guards/school police, random sweeps for
contraband, security cameras, and locked gates. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra
note 1, at 31.
151. Id. at 31. A school’s student minority population included students who were African
American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and American Indian/Alaska native students. See
SIMONE ROBERS, JIJUN ZHANG, JENNIFER TRUMAN & THOMAS D. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2011, at 112 (2012).
152. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 32–33.
153. Id.; see also Aaron Kupchik & Geoff Ward, Race, Poverty, and Exclusionary School
Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, 12 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 332, 341–42 (2014); Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat
and Punitive School Discipline, 57 SOC. PROBS. 25, 27 (2010). These incidents included
violent incidents; threats of violence; possession of a firearm, explosive device, knife, or other
sharp object; possession, distribution, or use of illegal drugs, inappropriate prescription drugs,
or alcohol; incidents of theft over ten dollars; and incidents of vandalism. See 2009–2010
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 147, at 15.
154. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 147, at 15.
155. The 2009–2010 SSOCS asked school principals to rate on a scale of one to five the
frequency of occurrences with respect to “[s]tudent racial/ethnic tensions,” “[s]tudent
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neighborhood crime, the 2009–2010 SSOCS asked school officials to assess the level
of crime in the area of their school on a scale of one to three (high, moderate, or
low).156 I also controlled for community and external groups’ involvement in the
school’s efforts to promote school safety;157 the geographic region of the state in
which the school was located;158 whether the school was located in a city, suburb,
town, or rural area;159 the school’s total student enrollment;160 building level;161
whether the school was a traditional school or nontraditional school (charter school
or magnet school);162 and the school’s student attendance rate. 163
In all of the empirical models, higher concentrations of minority students were
predictive of greater odds that schools relied on the designated combinations of
security measures.164 Furthermore, student race and ethnicity remained statistically
significant after controlling for the other factors described above, including school
crime, neighborhood crime, school disorder, school location, and the total number of
students enrolled at school.165 Stated another way, the analyses indicated that schools
with higher concentrations of students of color were more inclined to rely on intense
surveillance measures to maintain order and control than schools with lower
concentrations of students of color facing similar crime, discipline, and
neighborhood crime issues.166

bullying,” “[s]tudent sexual harassment of other students,” “[s]tudent harassment of other
students based on sexual orientation or gender identity (i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, questioning),” “[w]idespread disorder in the classroom,” “[s]tudent verbal abuse
of teachers,” “[s]tudent acts of disrespect for teachers other than verbal abuse,” “[g]ang
activities,” and “[c]ult or extremist group activities.” Id. at 13.
156. Id. at 17.
157. These groups included parent groups, social services agencies, juvenile justice
agencies, law enforcement agencies, mental health agencies, civic organizations/service clubs,
private corporations/businesses, and religious organizations. Nance, Students, Security, and
Race, supra note 1, at 34.
158. The NCES divided up states into four categories: Northeastern State, Southern State,
Western State, or Midwestern State. Id. at 35.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. I examined only secondary schools. Accordingly, I controlled for whether the
school was a middle school, defined as schools in which the lowest grade is not lower than
grade four and the highest grade is not higher than grade nine; a high school, defined as schools
in which the lowest grade is not lower than grade nine and the highest grade is not higher than
grade twelve; or a combined school, defined as other combinations of grades, including K–12
schools. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 35; Institute of Education
Sciences, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and Safety in U.S. Public Schools: Findings from the
School Survey on Crime and Safety: 2009–10, at 7 (2011).
162. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 35.
163. Id. at 35–36.
164. Id. at 40–41.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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B. 2013–2014 SSOCS Study
In 2017, I again tested the hypothesis that schools with higher concentrations of
minority students were associated with greater odds of relying on intense
surveillance methods than schools with lower concentrations of minority students,
even after taking into account other factors that might influence school officials’
decisions to implement such measures.167 In 2015, the U.S. Department of Education
released a new set of data on the security practices of public schools throughout the
United States: the 2013–2014 School Survey on Crime and Safety (2013–2014
SSOCS).168 Because of funding reductions,169 NCES selected fewer schools to
participate in the study (approximately 1600 schools) and designed a smaller
questionnaire than it had in prior years. 170 Thus, I was not able to control for exactly
the same factors I did in the 2009–2010 SSOCS study. Nevertheless, the 2013–2014
SSOCS asked principals to respond to the same questions relating to school security
practices as the 2009–2010 SSOCS,171 allowing me to construct several
combinations of security measures.172
Similar to the 2009–2010 SSOCS study, even after controlling for school crime,
school disorder, geographic region, urbanicity, building level, and total student
enrollment,173 all of the empirical models showed that higher concentrations of
minority students were predictive of greater odds that schools relied on the
designated combinations of security measures.174
C. Other Empirical Studies
Other empirical studies also demonstrate the strong connection between race and
the use of intense surveillance measures. For example, Jeremy Finn and Timothy

167. See Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra
note 1, at 805–11, for a detailed description of the study’s dataset, variables, results, as well
as its limitations.
168. See Institute of Education Sciences, supra note 5.
169. See e-mail from Kathryn A. Chandler, Dir., El/Sec Sample Surveys Program, Nat’l
Ctr. for Educ. Statistics to Jason P. Nance, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll.
of Law (May 21, 2013, 2:41 PM) (unpublished e-mail on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
170. Institute of Education Sciences, supra note 5, at 1.
171. See id. at C-4 to C-5.
172. See Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra
note 1, at 806 n.247.
173. I constructed these variables largely in the same manner as I did in the 2009–2010
SSOCS study except for school crime. See id. at 807–08. Because the 2013–2014 SSOCS
asked school officials to report fewer incidents than the 2009–2010 SSOCS, I created only
two categories of crimes: (1) incidents involving weapons or sexual battery and (2) incidents
not involving weapons or sexual battery (robbery without a weapon, physical attack without a
weapon, and threat of a physical attack without a weapon). Id. at 807 & nn.250–51.
174. Id. at 809–11. I note that the 2013–2014 SSOCS did not include the percentage of
minority students attending schools. Rather, it contained only a categorical variable for student
race (0–19% minority, 20–49% minority, and over 50% minority). Id. at 806–07. While this
categorical variable is less robust than a continuous variable, it still provides useful information
regarding the relationship between race and the use of security measures. Id. at 806.
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Servoss examined the relationship between the use of security measures and race by
examining data from the Common Core of Data, the Civil Rights Data Collection,
and the Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002.175 Finn and Servoss found that of
all of the factors they examined, “[t]he strongest correlation was with the percentage
of Black students in the school. That is, the percentage of Black students enrolled
was more highly related to security levels than was any other characteristic,” 176
including the percentage of socioeconomically disadvantaged students,
neighborhood crime, building level, the number of students enrolled, and
urbanicity.177 Furthermore, the percentage of African American students was still
strongly connected to school security levels after controlling for other school and
student characteristics.178
Katarzyna T. Steinka-Fry and her colleagues also examined the relationship
between race and the use of security measures by analyzing four years of SSOCS
data and the School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Study. 179
They also discovered that, even after accounting for school structural features, school
disorder, urbanicity, neighborhood crime, and geographic region, higher
concentrations of low-income and African American students were associated with
using intense security measures.180 Furthermore, they found that African American
and Hispanic students were more likely to report attending a school that relied on
intense security measures.181
Karen DeAngelis and her colleagues examined Texas financial data to examine
how much school districts spend on school security and the extent to which spending
differed according to school district characteristics. 182 The state of Texas mandates

175. See Finn & Servoss, supra note 43, at 46.
176. Id. at 49; see also Servoss & Finn, supra note 143, at 80 (“In sum, a high proportion
of Black students in a school is related to the degree of security the school implements above
and beyond all other characteristics we studied.”).
177. Finn & Servoss, supra note 43, at 46–49; see also Servoss & Finn, supra note 143, at
79–80.
178. In another study that Timothy Servoss conducted, again examining the Education
Longitudinal Study of 2002, he found that “students in high security schools are 11.78 times
more likely to be African American than White . . . and 1.56 times more likely to be
Hispanic/Latino than White.” Servoss, supra note 142, at 767; see also IVORY A. TOLDSON,
BREAKING BARRIERS 2: PLOTTING THE PATH AWAY FROM JUVENILE DETENTION AND TOWARD
ACADEMIC SUCCESS FOR SCHOOL-AGE AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES 7 (2011) (finding that black
students were approximately 4.8 times more likely to report passing through a metal detector
when entering school than white students, and Latino students were approximately 2.65 times
as likely to report passing through metal detectors when entering school than white students);
Thomas J. Mowen & Karen F. Parker, Minority Threat and School Security: Assessing the
Impact of Black and Hispanic Student Representation on School Security Measures, 30
SECURITY J. 504, 514–19 (2016) (finding that the percentage of African American students at
a school was positively related to the use of strict security measures).
179. Katarzyna T. Steinka-Fry, Benjamin W. Fisher & Emily E. Tanner-Smith, Visible
School Security Measures Across Diverse Middle and High School Settings: Typologies and
Predictors, 11 J. APPLIED SECURITY RES. 422, 424 (2016).
180. Id. at 431.
181. Id.
182. Karen J. DeAngelis, Brian O. Brent & Danielle Ianni, The Hidden Cost of School
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that all districts report expenses relating to security equipment, such as metal
detectors and surveillance cameras, security guards, hall monitors for security, and
security vehicles.183 Their study revealed that even after accounting for school
district characteristics such as urbanicity, student enrollment, wealth of the district
per average daily attendance, and student poverty, school districts serving higher
concentrations of minority students spent more on average on security measures than
other school districts.184 Furthermore, their analysis demonstrated that poorer school
districts serving higher concentrations of low-income and minority students on
average spent disproportionately more on school security than other school
districts.185
In 2013, I conducted an empirical study186 on a particularly intrusive and intense
surveillance measure defined in the SSOCS questionnaires as “random sweeps for
contraband (e.g., drugs or weapons), but not including dog sniffs.” 187 While it is not
entirely clear how school officials interpreted this question, one reasonably envisions
that “random sweeps for contraband” encompasses practices similar to the measures
employed on students described in this Article’s introduction, such as random,
suspicionless searches of students’ belongings and pat downs.188 Examining only
data from schools that reported no incidents whatsoever relating to weapons, alcohol,
or illegal drugs during the school year, I found that schools serving higher
concentrations of minority students had greater odds of relying on this particularly
intrusive surveillance practice, even after taking into account factors such as school
officials’ perceptions of crime where students reside, school officials’ perceptions of
crime where the school is located, student poverty, school level, school enrollment
size, urbanicity, and geographic location.189
Still other empirical studies, though not directly related to the disparate use of
security measures along racial and ethnic lines, demonstrate that student race and
ethnicity are strongly associated with the use of punitive disciplinary measures. Kelly
Welch and Allison Payne observed that schools serving higher concentrations of
African American students were more likely to impose harsher punishments for
student misbehavior, such as suspensions, expulsions, and referring students to law
enforcement.190 They also discovered that schools with higher concentrations of
African American students were (1) less likely to use softer disciplinary measures
such as oral reprimands or referrals to visit with the school counselor, and (2) less
supportive of restorative justice programs and alternative forms of discipline, such
as assigning students to perform community service. 191 In a very recent empirical

Security, 36 J. EDUC. FIN. 312 (2011).
183. Id. at 318–19.
184. Id. at 329.
185. Id. at 329–31.
186. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra note 1, at 418–23.
187. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 147, at 5; see also Nance, Random,
Suspicionless Searches, supra note 1, at 418–23.
188. See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 147, at 3–6.
189. See Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra note 1, at 418–23.
190. Welch & Payne, supra note 153, at 36.
191. Id. at 36–37; see also Welch & Payne, supra note 99, at 3–4 (“A growing body of
research indicates that racial threat may be operating in schools, with high black student body
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study, Welch and Payne also found that schools serving more Latino students
implemented harsher disciplinary policies and practices than other schools, even
after controlling for other student, school, and community characteristics. 192 As Kelly
Welch explains, “[S]ome policymakers and administrators perceive there to be a
greater risk that needs managing because certain schools are disproportionately
composed of racial and ethnic minority students, and this perception is responsible
for the production of more intense disciplinary policies and practices.”193
Tellingly, racial disparities in suspensions, expulsions, student referrals to law
enforcement, and school-based arrests have been documented repeatedly at the local,
state, and national levels for years. 194 While some may believe that these racial
disparities exist because of differences in behavior with respect to these student
groups, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) refutes this
point, observing that more frequent or serious misbehavior by minority students does
not adequately explain these disparities. 195 Rather, the OCR disturbingly confirmed
that it has found “cases where African Americans students were disciplined more
harshly and more frequently because of their race than similarly situated white
students. In short, racial discrimination in school discipline is a real problem.”196
Indeed, there are several empirical studies that corroborate the OCR’s findings. 197
In addition, it is important to observe that the empirical studies discussed above
do not even begin to fully illuminate the problem of racial inequalities in our public
school system overall. For example, minority students are disproportionately
retained from grade to grade,198 suffer from lower academic expectations from

composition associated with more punitive and less mild practices . . . .”).
192. Welch & Payne, supra note 99, at 10–16.
193. Welch, supra note 77, at 2 (emphasis in original).
194. Russell J. Skiba, Mariella I. Arredondo & Natasha T. Williams, More Than a
Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusionary Discipline to a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546, 550 (2014); see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2, 6 (2014);
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 2013–2014 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION:
A FIRST LOOK 3 (2016); Nance, supra note 47, at 331–32.
195. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON THE
NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 3 (Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter
DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER].
196. Id. at 4.
197. See, e.g., Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the Antecedents
of the “School-to-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 653–54 (2011); Russell J. Skiba, Robert H. Horner, ChoongGeun Chung, M. Karega Rausch, Seth L. May & Tary Tobin, Race Is Not Neutral: A National
Investigation of African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH.
PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 95–101 (2011); see also Welch & Payne, supra note 99, at 92 (“[O]ne of
the strongest and most consistent predictors of discipline is student race and ethnicity: Black
and Latino/a students experience more frequent and intense school punishments for the same
or lesser offenses than their white peers . . . .”).
198. See, e.g., Institute of Education Sciences, Status and Trends in the Education of Racial
and Ethnic Groups 92 tbl. 17a (2010); Catherine E. Lhamon, Five New Facts from the Civil
Rights Data Collection, HOMEROOM: OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 21, 2014),
https://blog.ed.gov/2014/03/five-new-facts-from-the-civil-rights-data-collection/
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teachers,199 and are overrepresented in restrictive special education programs. 200 The
above studies also do not convey the inequalities that youth of color experience in
areas outside of public education, such as in the juvenile justice system. Empirical
studies reveal that minority youth, particularly African Americans, are much more
likely to be involved in and treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than
similarly situated white youth.201 They are disproportionately arrested, referred to
juvenile justice court, adjudicated by juvenile court, detained, and sentenced to adult
state prisons.202
All of these empirical studies lead to the same conclusion: youth of color,
especially African Americans, are treated more harshly than similarly-situated white
youth in many contexts, including with respect to decisions of whether to employ
intense surveillance measures. It is likely that many factors contribute to racial
disparities in public education,203 including in the area of security measures.
Nevertheless, these empirical studies also strongly suggest that student race in and
of itself illegitimately influences school officials’ decisions to implement harsher
surveillance measures among the student body. 204
Although a few school officials and teachers may be motivated by racial animus
in their decision-making, it is much more likely that the vast majority of school
officials and teachers are committed to serving students in good faith. 205 The science

[https://perma.cc/7AMR-NEM5].
199. See, e.g., SARAH E. REDFIELD, DIVERSITY REALIZED: PUTTING THE WALK WITH THE
TALK FOR DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 72–76 (2009); Ronald F. Ferguson, Teachers’
Perceptions and Expectations and the Black-White Test Score Gap, 38 URB. EDUC. 460, 477–
78 (2003).
200. See CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TOPRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 53–54 (2010); PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE
TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS AND OTHER REFLECTIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION, at xvii (2008).
201. See Juvenile Arrests 2008–2011, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/qa05104.asp?qaDate=2008 [https://
perma.cc/57VJ-SC8W]; Nancy E. Dowd, What Men?: The Essentialist Error of the “End of
Men”, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1226–27 (2013) (providing evidence that African American
youth are overrepresented in the juvenile justice system and receive disparate and harsher
treatment).
202. See Mark Soler, Dana Shoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a
New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 530–31 (2009).
203. See, e.g., Daniel Losen, Cheri Hodson, Jongyeon Ee & Tia Martinez, Disturbing
Inequities: Exploring the Relationship Between Racial Disparities in Special Education
Identification and Discipline, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES
FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at 91–92 (explaining that minority students are
more likely to have inexperienced teachers); Nance, supra note 144, at 2–7 (discussing vast
resource and student integration inequalities that lead to education outcome inequalities).
204. See Welch, supra note 77, at 5 (“Research has made it overwhelmingly clear that
students are not at equal risk for experiencing the punitive school control measures that
contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline. . . . Racial and ethnic composition influences the
degree to which schools implement harsh disciplinary policies and use harsh practices.”).
205. See id.; Staats, supra note 63, at 29 (“As a profession, teaching is full of wellintentioned individuals deeply committed to seeing all children succeed.”); cf. Richardson,
supra note 52, at 1148 (“The typical arguments that the disproportionate policing of Blacks
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of implicit racial bias provides a compelling explanation for how some school
authorities can seemingly act in good faith and without a conscious intent to racially
discriminate, yet unknowingly create and perpetuate racial inequalities by making
decisions that harm students of color based on unconscious stereotypes and
attitudes.206 As discussed above, working in a school serving a high concentration of
students of color may unconsciously affect school officials’ perceptions, actions,
behaviors, and decision-making regarding how to create orderly learning
environments, especially when school officials may unconsciously associate
minority students with danger, aggression, crime, disorder, and violence. 207 Indeed,
most researchers conclude that one of the causes of racial disparities in public
education generally is the unconscious racial biases of teachers and school
officials.208 Given the empirical evidence discussed above, it is logical to conclude
that implicit racial bias also influences school officials’ decisions to employ intense
surveillance measures as well.
III. HARMS OF INTENSE SURVEILLANCE MEASURES
Few will maintain that relying on coercive surveillance measures that limit
students’ privacy is ideal. However, the rationale behind surveillance measures is not
difficult to understand. Certain activities and items that students bring to school can
threaten the well-being and safety of other students and themselves, and students may
hide such items and activities from school authorities. 209 Accordingly, school
officials and others claim that school authorities need access to students’ belongings
and private activities so that they can expose contraband and deter wrongful, unsafe
behavior.210 Indeed, many will argue that our children’s safety is paramount and
overrides any concerns the use of these measures creates. The problem with this
rationale, however, is that, as Aaron Kupchik astutely observes, “Instead of asking
whether tighter security measures and harsher punishments are a good idea for
schools, the public, school administrators, politicians, and others simply assume that

can be explained either by conscious racial bias on the part of the police or by the assumption
that Blacks engage in more ambiguously criminal behavior does not withstand scrutiny.”).
206. See Devine et al., supra note 46, at 1267; Redfield, supra note 46, at 4.
207. See Servoss & Finn, supra note 143, at 64 (explaining that as the proportion of
minorities in a school rises, school officials are more prone to rely on punitive discipline
methods to combat crime-related threats and to maintain dominance).
208. See, e.g., DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 147
(2013) (“[T]oday racial discrimination is more likely to be the result of subtle or unconscious
biases, on which a state actor may not even realize it is acting.”); Jamilia J. Blake, Bettie Ray
Butler & Danielle Smith, Challenging Middle-Class Notions of Femininity: The Causes of
Black Females’ Disproportionate Suspension Rates, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP:
EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at 76 (“Although a number
of factors are believed to contribute to disproportionate disciplinary practices, racial/ethnic
bias has been implicated most frequently . . . .”).
209. See BRYAN R. WARNICK, UNDERSTANDING STUDENT RIGHTS IN SCHOOLS: SPEECH,
RELIGION, AND PRIVACY IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 136 (2013).
210. Id.
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they are. Rather than engaging with the problem of school safety and seeking
information, these groups more often respond out of fear.” 211
This Part discusses the harms that result from the overreliance of extreme
surveillance measures in schools, particularly on students of color when these
measures are applied disproportionately. It also evaluates the effectiveness of these
measures in schools, concluding that, at best, the evidence suggests that their
effectiveness is far from clear and, at worst, that they may lead to more disorder,
destabilization, and dysfunction in the long term.
A. Overreliance on Intense Surveillance Measures Harms Students’ Interests
Empirical evidence suggests that overreliance on intense surveillance measures
may harm students’ interests in at least two major ways. First, they may contribute
to dysfunctional learning environments that lead to poor student outcomes.
Education policy experts understand that cooperation and trust among members of
the school community are fundamental to healthy learning climates, positive learning
outcomes, and school safety.212 Optimal learning conditions for students include
experiencing positive relationships with teachers and other students, being treated
fairly, feeling a sense of belonging in the school community, and having a positive
self-image.213 When students distrust teachers or doubt that they belong in school,
they are prone to disengage academically and misbehave.214
Many scholars observe that intense surveillance environments in schools disrupt
feelings of cooperation, trust, and respect among members of the community by
sending a clear signal to students that they are prone to illegal activity, dangerous,
and violent.215 Paul Hirschfield maintains that intense surveillance measures create

211. KUPCHIK, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis in original).
212. See WARNICK, supra note 209, at 146–50; Roger D. Goddard, Megan TschannenMoran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multilevel Examination of the Distribution and Effects of Teacher
Trust in Students and Parents in Urban Elementary Schools, 102 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 3, 3–4
(2001) (observing that trust is an important element of the teaching and learning process).
213. Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, N.Y. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION (June 14, 2006), http://www.nyclu.org/content/over-policing-schoolsstudents-education-and-privacy-rights [https://perma.cc/CF3X-VEQU] (featuring the June 14,
2006, testimony of Donna Lieberman, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, before the New York City
Council Committee on Education and Public Safety Regarding the Impact of Over-Policing in
Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights); see also LINDA DARLING- HAMMOND,
THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL
DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 65 (2010).
214. See Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African
Americans: Defiance or Cooperation in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455,
458, 469–70 (2008); Jason A. Okonofua, Gregory M. Walton & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, A
Vicious Cycle: A Social-Psychological Account of Extreme Racial Disparities in School
Discipline, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 381, 385 (2016).
215. See WARNICK, supra note 209, at 148 (“One of the moral problems with constant
surveillance is that is says to students that teachers do not trust them as responsible human
beings . . . and is therefore a barrier to accomplishing the educational mission of the school.”);
Pedro A. Noguera, Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to
School Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190–91 (1995).
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disunity, discord, and social barriers among students, teachers, and school
officials.216 Martin Gardner observes that suspicionless searches convey to students
a message that each is a suspect, which is problematic because of the special
relationship that should exist between educators and their students. 217 In her dissent
in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also argued
that suspicionless searches send harmful messages to students.218 She explained:
[I]ntrusive, blanket searches of schoolchildren, most of whom are
innocent, for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any
traditional school function of which I am aware. Indeed, many schools,
like many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do
otherwise. As James Acton’s father said on the witness stand,
“[suspicionless testing] sends a message to children that are trying to be
responsible citizens . . . that they have to prove that they’re innocent
. . . , and I think that kind of sets a bad tone for citizenship.”219
In an ethnographic study, Jen Weiss observed that intense surveillance measures
caused students to avoid and distrust school officials. 220 Instead of providing a greater
sense of safety, students felt a heightened sense of disillusion and danger. 221 Donna
Liebermann testified that intense surveillance measures do not foster educational
environments that promote learning and social growth in youth.222 Instead, these
measures create environments “where children perceive that they are being treated
as criminals; where they are diminished by such perceptions; and where they,
consequentially, cultivate negative attitudes toward their schools.” 223 Timothy
Servoss maintains that intense surveillance measures require “passivity and
compliance” from students, but they often cause conflict because many students are
not passive and blindly compliant. 224 When students feel powerless and stifled, they

216. Hirschfield, supra note 4, at 46.
217. Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an
Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA.
L. REV. 897, 943 (1988).
218. 515 U.S. 646, 682 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
219. Id. at 682 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (all but the first alteration in original).
220. Jen Weiss, Scan This: Examining Student Resistance to School Surveillance, in
SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 4,
at 213, 277.
221. Id. at 213–14; see also KIM BROOKS, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG,
SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: TWO YEARS LATER 3 (2000) (“Parents and school boards continue to
call for more metal detectors, locker searches and student identification badges, even as
students say they feel less safe and report more crime in schools that use these ‘secure’ school
procedures.”).
222. See Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, supra note
213.
223. Id.; see also BROOKS ET AL., supra note 221, at 3 (quoting a student saying “[w]hen I
get up to go to school in the morning, I don’t want to feel like I’m going to a correctional
facility”); Finn & Servoss, supra note 43, at 44 (maintaining that prisonlike conditions make
“students feel defensive and contribute to their emotional and physical disengagement from
school”).
224. See Servoss, supra note 142, at 757.
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become frustrated and lose motivation to follow school norms and exhibit positive
social behavior.225
Importantly, there are parallel findings in studies that examine the social costs
incurred in communities whose members are subject to intense surveillance and the
threat of government punishment.226 According to Tom Tyler, intense surveillance
measures in communities signal distrust, which decreases community members’
capacity to feel positively about themselves and their communities. 227 He observes
that intense surveillance environments cause community members to perceive
unjustified intrusions into their privacy as unfair, making them resentful and less
willing to comply with the law. 228 Accordingly, regardless of whether intense
surveillance methods are effective in the short term, they incur unintended social
costs—such as paranoia, distrust, and loss of respect for governmental authority
—and weaken individuals’ resolve to willingly obey laws, cooperate with
government officials, and participate in political processes over the long term.229
In addition to contributing to poor learning climates, overreliance on intense
surveillance measures harm students’ interests in a second significant way. Intense
surveillance methods often are a component of involving more students in the
criminal justice system, a phenomenon frequently referred to as the “school-to-prison
pipeline.”230 Many school officials rely on intense surveillance methods in
connection with zero tolerance policies and other punitive disciplinary measures in
their efforts to control students.231 When schools use intense surveillance methods in
conjunction with extreme discipline measures, such as zero-tolerance policies,
school officials automatically suspend, expel, or refer students to law enforcement
when they identify students with items they are not permitted to bring to school,
regardless of the seriousness of the offense or the surrounding circumstances. 232
For example, in In re Expulsion of A.D., a student was expelled from school
pursuant to a school district’s zero tolerance weapons policy for accidentally carrying
a three-inch folding pocketknife to school in her purse.233 A school police officer
discovered the pocketknife when he searched through A.D.’s locker and personal
belongings during a planned, random, suspicionless search for controlled
substances.234 When the school police officer and principal confronted A.D., A.D.

225. Id.
226. See Tom R. Tyler & Lindsay Rankin, Legal Socialization and Delinquency, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 353, 361 (Barry C. Feld &
Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012).
227. Id.; see also David Kipnis, Trust & Technology, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS:
FRONTIERS OF THEORY & RESEARCH 39, 46–47 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds.,
1996).
228. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 226, at 361; Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, The Role
of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 513, 514 (2003).
229. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 226, at 361–62.
230. See Nance, supra note 47, at 343.
231. Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment
Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 952–53 (2011).
232. See Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 42, at 852.
233. 883 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. 2016).
234. Id. at 254.
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explained that she had used the pocketknife at her boyfriend’s family farm to cut
twine on hay bales the previous weekend and had forgotten to remove it from her
purse.235 Even though the school principal believed that A.D. was telling the truth,
she expelled A.D. for the remainder of the school year pursuant to the zero tolerance
policy.236 Empirical evidence reveals the association between surveillance measures
and student exclusion. Timothy Servoss and Jeremy Finn analyzed data from several
national databases and found that higher levels of security and surveillance in schools
were connected with higher student suspension rates. 237 Even more troubling, these
researchers discovered that school security levels are associated with larger
disparities in suspension rates among similarly situated African American and white
students.238 In high-security schools, the odds of suspending an African American
student were 2.7 times greater than for a white student. 239
Exclusionary practices, such as suspension and expulsion, often lead to poor
student outcomes.240 For example, not only do excluded students miss classroom
instruction and often fall behind academically, but exclusion also may stigmatize
them, promote disengagement and school avoidance, and inhibit access to needed
resources.241 Empirical evidence shows that exclusion significantly decreases the
likelihood that students will graduate from high school.242 Not graduating from high
school leads to many other social problems, including unemployment, poverty,
increased reliance on welfare programs, decreased participation in democratic
processes, bad health, and future involvement in the criminal justice system.243
Empirical evidence also shows that exclusion is strongly connected to immediate
involvement in the juvenile justice system. 244 When students are not in school and
are left unsupervised, they are more likely to engage in delinquent acts. 245

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Servoss & Finn, supra note 143, at 82–83.
238. Finn & Servoss, supra note 43, at 53.
239. Id.
240. Nance, supra note 47, at 321–24.
241. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 195, at 4; Pedro A. Noguera, Schools,
Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42
THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 345–46 (2003).
242. See, e.g., Robert Balfanz, Vaughan Byrnes & Joanna Hornig Fox, Sent Home and Put
Off Track, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE
EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at 17, 22–29; Miner P. Marchbanks III, Jamilia J. Blake, Eric A.
Booth, Dottie Carmichael, Allison L. Seibert & Tony Fabelo, The Economic Effects of
Exclusionary Discipline on Grade Retention and High School Dropout, in CLOSING THE
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at
59, 64.
243. Nance, supra note 47, at 322; see also CLIVE R. BELFIELD, HENRY M. LEVIN & RACHEL
ROSEN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012).
244. TONY FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE CARMICHAEL,
MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE
STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
INVOLVEMENT 43 (2011).
245. American Acad. of Pediatrics, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 112
PEDIATRICS 1206, 1207 (2003); see KUPCHIK, supra note 4, at 23–24.
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Notably, empirical data suggest that overreliance on exclusionary discipline also
may not lead to safer school environments in the long-term.246 Matthew Steinberg
and his colleagues found that teachers and students reported lower levels of perceived
safety in schools with higher suspension rates, even after taking into account other
community and school contextual variables that might explain those perceptions. 247
They warned that “schools with high suspension rates are still less safe than others
that serve students with similar backgrounds in similar neighborhoods . . . . Through
their disciplinary practices, schools serving students from high-crime/high-poverty
neighborhoods might unwittingly be exacerbating their low levels of safety.” 248
B. The Effectiveness of Intense Surveillance Measures is Unclear
The safety of our children at school is critical. Violence in schools—such as what
occurred in Columbine, Newtown, Parkland, and Santa Fe—is heart-wrenching and
provokes intense feelings of anger, fear, confusion, and sadness. When the media
provides broad coverage of violence in schools, many respond by calling for
increased school security measures and surveillance to prevent it from happening
again.249 Indeed, implementing strict security measures is something tangible that
school authorities can do to demonstrate to concerned parents and community
members that they are trying to make schools safer for children. But there is much to
consider when deciding how to create safe learning environments for youth.
A difficult truth we must all accept is that it is impossible to protect all students
at all times and in all places, including while they are in school classrooms and
hallways, school courtyards, school playgrounds, school parking lots, and attending
extracurricular events.250 Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that although
highly publicized acts of school violence often distort our perceptions of the realities

246. The U.S. Department of Education recently cautioned schools to “avoid overuse of
exclusionary discipline, . . . reserv[ing] the use of out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, and
alternative placements for the most egregious disciplinary infractions that threaten school
safety and when mandated by federal or state law.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE 15 (2014) [hereinafter
GUIDING PRINCIPLES].
247. Matthew P. Steinberg, Elaine Allensworth & David W. Johnson, What Conditions
Support Safety in Urban Schools?: The Influence of School Organizational Practices on
Student and Teacher Reports of Safety in Chicago, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP:
EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at 118, 127–29.
248. Id. at 128–29.
249. Cheryl Lero Jonson, Preventing School Shootings: The Effectiveness of Safety
Measures, 12 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 956, 960 (2017).
250. See Arne Duncan, Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: HOMEROOM; OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Dec. 17, 2012),
https://blog.ed.gov/2012/12/resources-for-schools-to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/4JNX-4FG6] (explaining that not all tragedies that happen at school can be
prevented).
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of school safety,251 schools are actually among the safest places for children to be.252
Of course, we need to do more to ensure the safety of all students while they are at
school, and this does not imply that security measures should never be used. But
there are serious questions regarding whether intense surveillance tactics actually
make schools safer, provide only a false perception of security, or lead to more
disorder.253
Emily Tanner-Smith and her colleagues analyzed nationally representative data
to examine the relationship between the use of multiple forms of security measures
and students’ exposure to drugs, violence, crime, and firearms at school. 254 They
found that “[d]espite the intuitive appeal and increased federal funding for visible
school security measures in recent decades, [there was] no evidence that school
security measures—either alone or in combination with others—consistently
reduced exposure to crime and violence at school.” 255 Instead, their empirical
findings suggested that intense security measures were associated with unstable
school environments, observing that “some patterns of school security utilization
were associated with increased exposure to crime and violence at school.” 256 These
scholars concluded that intense security measures “may ultimately erode student
trust, create negative expectancy effects, and create jail-like learning environments

251. Beger, supra note 40, at 338 (“Widely publicized incidents of juvenile violence in
public schools have created the public misconception that such behavior is commonplace.”);
Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, School Violence and Disruption Revisited: Equity and
Safety in the School House, 40 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 1, 6 (2007) (“[M]edia coverage
of school violence has shaped the public’s beliefs, and in many cases has led to a distorted
perception of violence in schools, as well as adolescent violence more generally.”).
252. BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY, SCHOOL SAFETY IN NORTH
CAROLINA: REALITIES, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (2013) (“School violence that
results in death is extremely rare. Young people are much more likely to be harmed in the
home or on the street than they are in schools.” (footnote omitted)); KUPCHIK, supra note 4, at
11 (explaining that the “data are clear and convincing that schools are safer, nationally,” than
in decades); Duncan, supra note 250 (“Schools are among the safest places for children and
adolescents in our country, and, in fact, crime in schools has been trending downward for more
than a decade.”).
253. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
JAILHOUSE TRACK 8 (2005) (arguing that strict security measures may “produce a perception
of safety, [but] there is little or no evidence that they create safer learning environments or
change detrimental behaviors”); Mowen et al., supra note 39, at 474 (“[T]here is no clear
evidence that the criminalization of school discipline is effective at preventing school
violence.”); Richard E. Redding & Sarah M. Shalf, The Legal Context of School Violence: The
Effectiveness of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence
in Schools, 23 LAW & POL’Y 297, 319 (2001) (explaining that “[i]t is hard to find anything
better than anecdotal evidence” showing that strict security measures such as metal detectors
and guards reduce violence in schools).
254. Emily E. Tanner-Smith, Benjamin W. Fisher, Lynn A. Addington & Joseph H.
Gardella, Adding Security, but Subtracting Safety? Exploring Schools’ Use of Multiple Visible
Security Measures, 43 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 102, 105 (2017).
255. Id. at 115.
256. Id. at 113.
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that fail to provide the safe and supportive learning environments that all students
deserve.”257
Abigail Hankin and her colleagues reviewed the scholarly literature examining
whether metal detectors create safer school environments. 258 They determined that
there was “insufficient evidence to draw a conclusion about the potential beneficial
effect of metal detector use on student and staff behavior or perceptions.” 259 They
also reported that some of the research suggested that metal detector use was
positively related to lower levels of students’ perceptions of school safety and higher
levels of school disorder.260 The Congressional Research Service recently evaluated
the body of research on the effectiveness of school police officers programs for
promoting school safety and concluded that the research “draws conflicting
conclusions about whether [school police officer programs] are effective at reducing
school violence.”261 Cheryl Lero Jonson also reviewed the scholarly literature on
school police officer programs in schools and concluded that evaluations of these
programs “show that they often have little to no effect on crime occurring at school
and at times can increase fear and anxiety within the school setting.”262 Crystal
Garcia reported that only thirty-two percent of school safety officers she interviewed
believed that weapon detection systems effectively minimized or prevented violence
in schools.263 After reviewing the literature, Aaron Kupchik concluded that “there is
no compelling evidence that increases in policing, surveillance, suspensions, and the
like have made schools safer.”264
In fact, violent incidents continue to occur in schools that rely on surveillance
measures, demonstrating that these measures cannot fully prevent individuals from

257. Id. at 115.
258. Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas Simon, Impacts of Metal Detector Use in
Schools: Insights from 15 Years of Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 (2011).
259. Id.
260. Id.; see also John Blosnich & Robert Bossarte, Low-Level Violence in Schools: Is
There an Association Between School Safety Measures and Peer Victimization?, 81 J. SCH.
HEALTH 107, 107 (2011) (finding that school security measures did not reduce violent
behaviors related to bullying); Mayer & Leone, supra note 40, at 350, 352 (finding that student
victimization and school disorder were higher in schools using strict security measures). But
see Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Violence-Related Attitudes and Behaviors of High
School Students — New York City, 1992, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 773, 774
(1993) (reporting that students who attended schools using metal detectors “were less likely
to have carried a weapon inside the school building (7.8% versus 13.6%),” but the use of metal
detectors did not reduce school violence); Renee Wilson-Brewer & Howard Spivak, Violence
Prevention in Schools and Other Community Settings: The Pediatrician as Initiator, Educator,
Collaborator, and Advocate, 94 PEDIATRICS 623, 626–27 (1994) (stating that one school
system in New York City reported that after the school security staff began using hand-held
metal detectors to conduct unannounced lobby searches of students at the beginning of the
school day, weapon-related incidents decreased in thirteen of fifteen schools).
261. NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126, SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 10–11 (2013).
262. Jonson, supra note 249, at 961.
263. Crystal A. Garcia, School Safety Technology in America: Current Use and Perceived
Effectiveness, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 30, 40 (2003).
264. KUPCHIK, supra note 4, at 13.

2019]

RAC I AL BIAS A ND S TU DE NTS ’ RIG H TS

81

harming others when they are determined to do so. For example, the acts of school
violence at Columbine High School occurred notwithstanding the presence of an
armed police officer and an unarmed school security guard.265 The recent school
shootings in Parkland, Florida, occurred even though there was an armed school
police officer on scene at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.266 Similarly, in
2005, a student shot another student in a high school that had security guards, metal
detectors, and perimeter fencing. 267 In Jonesboro, Arkansas, the shooters “pull[ed]
the fire alarm, r[an] to a nearby wooded area, and shot[] their classmates and teachers
as they left the school.”268 Scholars and other commentators recognize that students
know how to bring weapons into schools without being detected, even in schools
where intense surveillance measures are present. 269 Ronald Stevens, an executive
director of the National School Safety Center, acknowledges that strict security
measures provide merely a false sense of security because “rule-followers will follow
the rules,” and “[r]ule-breakers will break the rules.”270 As Cheryl Lero Jonson
observes, “[l]ocks can be broken, metal detectors can fail, and officers cannot be
present everywhere at all times.”271
Many scholars maintain that instead of creating safe learning environments,
extreme surveillance measures hinder educators’ efforts because these measures can
engender alienation, resentment, mistrust, and resistance among students, which may
lead to even more disorder, dysfunction, and destabilization in schools. 272 Matthew

265. Jonson, supra note 249, at 962; see Marcus Wright, Experts Say Intrusive Security at
Public Schools Reproduces Social Inequality, MICH. CITIZEN (Nov. 21, 2012),
https://truthout.org/articles/experts-say-intrusive-security-at-public-schools-reproducessocial-inequality [https://perma.cc/X9DP-9CYT].
266. Chuck Johnston, Jamiel Lynch & Dakin Andone, Armed School Resource Officer
Stayed Outside as Florida Shooting Unfolded, Sherriff Says, CNN (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/22/us/florida-school-shooting/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5JV8-E6WK].
267. Sara Neufeld & Sumathi Reddy, Violent Week Renews Metal Detector Debate, BALT.
SUN (Oct. 14, 2006), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-10-14/news/0610140131_1_metal
-detectors-school-students-park-elementary-school [https://perma.cc/5WJ9-BM3R].
268. Jonson, supra note 249, at 964.
269. Noguera, supra note 215, at 193 (reporting that the students he spoke with understood
how to bring a weapon, undetected, into a school that used strict security measures); see also
Carol Ascher, Gaining Control of Violence in the Schools: A View from the Field, 100 ERIC
DIG. 5 (1994) (“[T]hose few students intent on bringing in weapons are inevitably a step ahead
of the security devices, which means that enforcement activities alone cannot create a safe
school.”); Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 267, at 151 (reporting that students interviewed
claimed that it was “easy to get around” metal detectors).
270. Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 267.
271. Jonson, supra note 249, at 988.
272. See Beger, supra note 40, at 340 (“[A]ggressive security measures produce alienation
and mistrust among students.”); Michael Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, 32 PSYCHOL.
TODAY 52, 56 (1999) (arguing that strict security measures alienate students); Amanda B.
Nickerson & Matthew P. Martens, School Violence: Associations with Control,
Security/Enforcement, Educational/Therapeutic Approaches, and Demographic Factors, 37
SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 228, 238–39 (2008) (finding that strict security measures and punitive
measures were positively associated with more school disorder and school crime); Christopher
J. Schreck, J. Mitchell Miller & Chris L. Gibson, Trouble in the School Yard: A Study of the
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Mayer and Peter Leone conducted an empirical study that involved almost 7000
students examining schools’ use of metal detectors, locked doors, locker searches,
and security guards.273 Rather than finding that these measures fostered safe learning
climates, they concluded that “less attention should be paid to running schools in an
overly restrictive manner and rather, schools should concentrate more on
communicating individual responsibility to students.” 274 They continued, “Viewed
in the context of a reciprocal relationship, the data may suggest that disorder and
restrictive management of the school premises may go hand in hand and may feed
off each other.”275
Importantly, intense surveillance measures do not address the underlying
problems associated with student misbehavior and crime or support long-term
solutions to effectively prevent school violence. 276 The U.S. Department of
Education and the U.S. Secret Service conducted a joint study to understand how to
more effectively prevent violent acts from occurring in schools. 277 They discovered
that in safe schools, “students develop the capacity to talk and openly share their
concerns without fear of shame and reprisal”; “students experience a sense of
emotional ‘fit’ and of respect”; there are “positive personal role models in its faculty”
and “place[s] for open discussion where diversity and differences are respected”;
“communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported”; “adults
and students respect each other”; and “conflict is managed and mediated
constructively.”278 They concluded that school climates that provide emotional
support, cultivate respect, and pay attention to students’ academic, social, and
emotional needs can best reduce the possibility of targeted violence. 279
In another study, Matthew Steinberg and his colleagues analyzed school safety in
the Chicago Public School System and discovered that even in schools serving high
concentrations of students from high-poverty and crime areas, “it is the quality of
relationships between staff and students and between staff and parents that most
strongly defines safe schools. Indeed, disadvantaged schools with high-quality
relationships actually feel safer than advantaged schools with low-quality
relationships.”280 However, as explained above, intense surveillance measures may

Risk Factors of Victimization at School, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 460, 471 (2003) (empirically
finding that students attending schools that undertake locker searches report more student
victimization).
273. Mayer & Leone, supra note 40, at 345.
274. Id. at 351.
275. Id.
276. See AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR
6 (2010) (observing that schools do not often address the underlying issues associated with
student misbehavior).
277. ROBERT A. FEIN, BRYAN VOSSEKUIL, WILLIAM S. POLLACK, RANDY BORUM, WILLIAM
MODZELESKI & MARISA REDDY, U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THREAT
ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO
CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES, at ii (2004).
278. Id. at 5–6, 11–12; see also FEDDERS, ET AL., supra note 252, at 6 (“Positive
relationships among students, families, teachers, administrators, and staff are the most
effective tools in creating a safe school environment.”).
279. FEIN ET AL., supra note 277, at 5–6.
280. MATTHEW P. STEINBERG, ELAINE ALLENSWORTH & DAVID W. JOHNSON, STUDENT AND
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inhibit the quality of relationships among members of the school community,
development of respect, and sense of emotional fit by creating feelings of mistrust,
resentment, alienation, adversity, and resistance among students. 281
Disturbingly, the millions of dollars spent on intense surveillance measures
diverts scarce funding that could be used to hire more behavioral specialists,
counselors, and mental health experts. The money could also be used to support other
evidence-based programs that reduce school violence without harming the learning
environment.282 As I discuss at length elsewhere,283 there are several initiatives, such
as restorative justice,284 Schoolwide Positive Behavioral Interventions and
Supports,285 social and emotional learning,286 and improving classroom instruction
and management skills of teachers287 that more effectively promote safe learning
environments than intense surveillance measures.
Indeed, there are many schools serving at-risk students that have successfully
created safe learning environments without relying on harsh surveillance
measures.288 Common characteristics of these schools include promoting dignity and
respect among members of the school community, compassionate and strong
leadership, open lines of communication, and establishing clear, fair, and consistent
disciplinary procedures and rules.289 Notably, schools focusing on these values enjoy

TEACHER SAFETY IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ROLES OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND
SCHOOL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2011); see also Mark T. Greenberg, Roger P. Weissberg,
Mary Utne O’Brien, Joseph E. Zins, Linda Fredericks, Hank Resnik & Maurice J. Elias,
Enhancing School-Based Prevention and Youth Development Through Coordinated Social,
Emotional, and Academic Learning, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 466, 468, 470 (2003) (finding that
schools can successfully improve student behavior by creating caring communities, enhancing
the school climate, and building trust among school staff, families, and students); Steinberg et
al., supra note 247, at 126 (reporting that school leadership, teacher collaboration, schoolfamily interactions, and student-teacher relationships explained eighty percent of the variance
associated with school safety as reported by students and teachers).
281. See supra notes 215–25 and accompanying text.
282. See Hankin et al., supra note 258, at 105 (“Metal detector programs are expensive,
and funds spent on metal detectors would not be available for other programs and strategies
that have been shown to be effective at reducing youth risk for violence and promoting prosocial behaviors.”).
283. See Nance, supra note 47, at 345–60.
284. See, e.g., Thalia González, Socializing Schools: Addressing Racial Disparities in
Discipline Through Restorative Justice, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE
REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION, supra note 43, at 151, 151–53.
285. See, e.g., Catherine P. Bradshaw, Mary M. Mitchell & Philip J. Leaf, Examining the
Effects of Schoolwide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports on Student Outcomes,
12 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 133, 133 (2010).
286. See, e.g., Joseph A. Durlak, Roger P. Weissberg, Allison B. Dymnicki, Rebecca D.
Taylor & Kriston B. Schellinger, The Impact of Enhancing Students’ Social and Emotional
Learning: A Meta-Analysis of School-Based Universal Interventions, 82 CHILD DEV. 405, 406
(2001).
287. See, e.g., David Osher, George G. Bear, Jeffrey R. Sprague & Walter Doyle, How
Can We Improve School Discipline?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 48, 49 (2010).
288. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SAFETY WITH DIGNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO THE
OVER-POLICING OF SCHOOLS 7–8 (2009).
289. Id. at 7.
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above-average graduation rates, attendance rates, and significantly lower crime and
suspension rates.290 These initiatives may take time and concerted effort to
implement effectively, but the empirical evidence demonstrates that educators who
do so more effectively foster safe environments, enhance the learning climate,
improve student behavior, and promote academic achievement more than they ever
could by relying on intense surveillance measures. 291
C. The Unequal Use of Intense Surveillance Measures on
Students of Color Is Particularly Harmful
That students of color are more likely to be subjected to intense school
surveillance measures is socially unjust and troubling for many reasons. First, this
trend may weaken minorities’ trust in government institutions and authority. 292
Institutional trust is fostered when individuals perceive that institutional authorities
have fair decision-making processes, are respectful, and have all individuals’ best
interests in mind.293 As David Yeager and his colleagues observe, by middle school,
minority students are “more likely than White peers to be racially and ethnically
aware—that is, to have conscious appraisals about how different racial and ethnic
groups are evaluated and treated by the larger society.” 294 When students of color
perceive that government institutions are treating them unfairly, they often refuse to
comply with institutional rules and policies, accelerating a self-reinforcing cycle of
punishment and distrust.295 This may also cause them to be cynical towards other
government authorities and institutions.296
Furthermore, for minority adolescents, distrust of institutions can amplify
quickly.297 When students of color perceive institutional unfairness, they tend to
expect it more in the future; when they expect it more, they perceive it more, and

290. Id.
291. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 30–44.
292. See VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS, at
xiv, 74–75, 133–38 (2011) (observing that students of color experience disproportionate
surveillance because “schools, police, probation officers, families, community centers, the
media, businesses, and other institutions systematically treat young people’s everyday
behaviors as criminal activity,” making them “feel criminalized from a young age”); JUVENILE
JUSTICE INFO. EXCH., supra note 28 (reporting that students of color often perceive their school
simply as an extension of a “police state” because they are subject to intense surveillance
environments both in their neighborhoods and in their schools); Noguera, supra note 241, at
343–44.
293. David S. Yeager, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, Sophia Yang Hooper & Geoffrey L.
Cohen, Loss of Institutional Trust Among Racial and Ethnic Minority Adolescents: A
Consequence of Procedural Injustice and a Cause of Life-Span Outcomes, 88 CHILD DEV. 658,
659 (2017).
294. Id. at 660 (emphasis in original); see also DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 213, at 65
(maintaining that young students of color are very observant of inequitable patterns along
racial lines).
295. Yeager et al., supra note 293, at 659–60.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 661.
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thus the cycle continues and is amplified.298 The trust between many students of color
and educators already is strained,299 and the disproportionate use of security
measures may further impair the trust needed to establish positive, safe learning
environments.300 Minerva Dickson’s experience exemplifies a troubling trend. When
Minerva learned that a student attending another school was not subject to the intense
surveillance conditions she encountered each day, she was dismayed. 301 She said, “I
thought all schools were like mine . . . . I couldn’t believe a student could just walk
into their school without dealing with all of that.”302
Second, the disproportionate use of intense surveillance methods on students of
color may exacerbate inequalities already present within our education system. 303
Schools that focus on custody and control above everything else deprive minority
students of quality educational experiences, inhibiting their ability to pursue future
educational and employment opportunities. 304 Furthermore, as discussed above,
intense surveillance measures, especially when used in connection with other
punitive disciplinary measures such as zero tolerance policies, are a component of
the larger “school-to-prison pipeline” phenomenon.305 Accordingly, disproportionate
exposure to intense surveillance measures also contributes to racial inequalities in
school discipline, academic achievement, high school graduation rates, and
involvement in the criminal justice system. 306

298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Constance A. Flanagan, Patricio Cumsille, Sukhdeep Gill & Leslie S.
Gallay, School and Community Climates and Civic Commitments: Patterns for Ethnic
Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 421, 423 (2007) (observing that studies
show that minority groups report “a lower sense of school belonging than do their European
American peers”); Rosa Hernández Sheets, Urban Classroom Conflict: Student-Teacher
Perception: Ethnic Integrity, Solidarity, and Resistance, 28 URB. REV. 165, 175–76 (1996)
(reporting that minority students in a study on classroom conflict believed that their teachers
did not care about them or respect them and that they abused their authority).
300. Kupchik & Ward, supra note 153, at 333; see supra notes 265–67 and accompanying
text.
301. See JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH., supra note 28.
302. Id.; cf. Nance, supra note 144, at 8 (reporting that when low-income minority students
who attended low-resourced schools were shown photos of high-resourced schools, they
responded with comments such as, “Those must be schools for white kids. They wouldn’t give
those materials to us.”).
303. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 153, at 337–38; Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis:
When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 108 (2001) (arguing
that inner-city, majority-minority schools operate not as institutions of education, but as
institutions of confinement and control).
304. See Hirschfield, supra note 4, at 40 (arguing that the disproportionate use of intense
surveillance methods prepares urban minority students to become “prisoners, soldiers, or
service sector workers”); Kupchik & Ward, supra note 153, at 338 (“[M]arginalized youth are
presumed to be young criminals and treated as such through exposure to the hard edge of
exclusive practices (e.g., police surveillance and metal detectors), while youth with social,
political, and cultural capital are presumed to be near normal and habituated for social
absorption in their selective exposure to inclusive security . . . .”).
305. See supra Section III.A.
306. See Finn & Servoss, supra note 43, at 53 (finding that security levels were positively
associated with greater racial disparities in suspensions); Edward W. Morris & Brea L. Perry,
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Third, the disproportionate use of coercive surveillance measures skews minority
students’ perceptions of their current and future standing in our society. Youth
advocates and scholars alike observe that how we treat students affects how students
act and who they eventually will become. 307 Pedro Noguera maintains that when we
label students as “defiant, maladjusted, and difficult to deal with . . . they are more
likely to internalize these labels and act out in ways that match the expectations that
have been set for them.”308 Henry Leonardatos, an experienced school administrator
in urban schools, observes that by subjecting students to pat downs, metal detectors,
and other coercive surveillance measures, the students begin to “play the role that is
expected of them—they will play the role of the criminal and victimizer . . . . You
end [up] putting the idea in the kid’s head that this is what he’s supposed to be
doing.”309
Fourth, the disparate use of intense surveillance measures contributes to the racial
divide in this nation by sending socially harmful messages to both students of color
and white students. The disproportionate use of coercive security measures signals
to everyone that white students are privileged and have greater privacy rights, while
students of color cannot be trusted. This is precisely the wrong message to send to
children, and it is inconsistent with values that public education should strive to
uphold.310 Rather, schools can and should play a vital role in mending racial divisions
by teaching students in word and by example that all students are entitled to equal
respect, privacy, and dignity. 311
IV. THE CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE GOVERNING THE
EVALUATION OF SURVEILLANCE MEASURES IN SCHOOLS
Why some schools, particularly those serving high concentrations of minority
students, have increasingly relied on intense surveillance measures to monitor and
control students is a complex question. As I have explained elsewhere, increased
reliance on coercive surveillance measures is a response to highly publicized acts of
school violence;312 part of a broader social movement towards the criminalization of
school discipline, which has included extensive federal and state funding for security

The Punishment Gap: School Suspension and Racial Disparities in Achievement, 63 SOC.
PROBS. 68, 81–84 (2016) (providing empirical evidence that school suspensions contribute to
racial inequalities in academic achievement).
307. See, e.g., RONNIE CASELLA, BEING DOWN: CHALLENGING VIOLENCE IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 71–72 (2001) (arguing that as “[s]tudents are deemed deviant, they are treated as
deviants, and therefore deviate as is expected of them”); J. Alleyne Johnson, Life After Death:
Critical Pedagogy in an Urban Classroom, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 213, 220–21 (1995)
(observing how students’ self-perceptions changed for the worse upon being assigned to a
special class once the students learned that the general perception of the class was that it was
for students who were “at risk,” “learning disabled,” and “disruptive”).
308. Noguera, supra note 241, at 343.
309. JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH., supra note 28.
310. Cf. Nance, supra note 144, at 14–15 (arguing that tolerating inequalities with respect
to school resources along racial lines sends minority students a message inconsistent with the
values that public education should uphold).
311. See Nance, supra note 47, at 351–52.
312. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 1, at 92–94.
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equipment and law enforcement officers in schools; 313 driven by high-stakes testing
laws, which may motivate some school officials to push low-performing students out
of school to avoid having their low scores count against their schools; 314 and a result
of schools’ lack of adequate resources to address students’ needs. 315 Yet the
proliferation of extreme surveillance measures, as well as their disparate use among
minority students, has been feasible due to a permissive legal backdrop. Indeed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has provided school officials with wide constitutional discretion
to freely employ a variety of intense surveillance methods, even in combination, with
almost no legal accountability. This is especially troublesome because, as discussed
above, implicit racial biases tend to translate into unjust and discriminatory behavior
when individuals have wide discretion with little accountability. 316
In this Part, I describe the current state of the Fourth Amendment doctrine in
schools. This doctrinal description will also provide the foundation for my proposed,
reformulated legal framework to evaluate the constitutionality of coercive
surveillance measures on students. However, before discussing the current state of
the Fourth Amendment doctrine in schools, it is important to point out that school
officials generally perform two types of searches: (1) searches based on
individualized suspicion to uncover evidence of wrongdoing and (2) random,
suspicionless searches on the general student body or a segment of the student
population to prevent or deter wrongdoing. This Article is concerned primarily with
intense surveillance practices designed to deter and prevent wrongdoing by routinely
subjecting a group of students—the vast majority of whom are innocent and have no
intention to commit wrongdoing—to random, suspicionless searches.317
The Court addressed students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools for the first
time in New Jersey v. T.L.O.318 Although T.L.O. is an individualized suspicion case,
many of the doctrinal principles the Court discussed there are important to having a
more complete understanding of the current framework the Court utilizes to evaluate
suspicionless searches of students.
In T.L.O., a teacher observed two students smoking in the bathroom in violation
of school rules and took them to the principal’s office. 319 One of the students admitted
to the vice principal that she had been smoking, but the other student, T.L.O, denied

313. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra note
1, at 780–81.
314. Id. at 781–82.
315. Id. at 783–84.
316. See Kang et al., supra note 70, at 1142; see Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at
2628.
317. In the Fourth Amendment case law and scholarship, sometimes these searches are
called government dragnets, special needs searches, or administrative searches. See Eve
Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 275–78 (2011);
Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110, 118–19
(2010). Further, I emphasize here that my proposed legal analysis should not necessarily apply
to contexts where there is an immediate, credible threat of harm to members of the school
community.
318. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
319. Id. at 328.
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the allegations.320 When the vice principal opened T.L.O.’s purse to search for
evidence of wrongdoing, he discovered a pack of cigarettes and other evidence of
illegal drug use and trafficking, such as cigarette rolling papers, marijuana, a pipe,
empty plastic bags, a substantial amount of money, and an index card containing a
list of students who appeared to owe T.L.O. money. 321 T.L.O. moved to suppress this
evidence in a criminal proceeding by arguing that her Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, but the Court upheld the constitutionality of the search.322
The Court’s decision is significant for several reasons. The Court unequivocally
held that the Fourth Amendment protects students from unreasonable searches by
school officials, overruling several lower courts’ holdings that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to school officials because of “the special nature of their
authority over schoolchildren.”323 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that (1)
“even a limited search of [a child’s] person is a substantial invasion of privacy,”324
(2) a search of a closed purse or bag “is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective
expectations of privacy,”325 and (3) although it may be challenging for school
officials to maintain environments conducive to learning, “the situation is not so dire
that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy.”326 The
Court explained that schools and prisons are not equivalent for Fourth Amendment
purposes because “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different
circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and
incarceration.”327
Nevertheless, while recognizing that students do enjoy protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment, the Court also held that students’ privacy rights must be
balanced against the teachers and school officials’ equally legitimate interest in
creating an orderly environment in which students can learn.328 Accordingly, to
empower school officials with greater flexibility to maintain order and control, the
Court relaxed the restrictions to which public authorities normally are subject. 329
Specifically, the Court determined that it is not necessary for school officials to
obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of violating a criminal law or
school rule.330 The Court also held that a school official’s level of suspicion of
wrongful behavior need not reach the level of probable cause. 331 Rather, in
determining whether a search of a student comports with the Fourth Amendment,

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 329.
323. Id. at 325. Prior to T.L.O., several lower courts applied the in loco parentis doctrine
when analyzing searches conducted by school officials, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to school officials because their authority was similar to that of a
parent, not the State. Id. at 332 n.2, 336.
324. Id. at 337.
325. Id. at 338.
326. Id.
327. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)).
328. Id. at 339.
329. Id. at 340.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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courts should examine whether the search was reasonable “[i]n the context within
which [the] search takes place.”332 Accordingly, the Court established a twofold
inquiry to determine the reasonableness of a search: (1) “whether the . . . action was
justified at its inception” and (2) “whether the search as actually conducted ‘was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.’”333 Applying that framework, the Court determined that the vice
principal’s search of the student’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 334
Ten years after T.L.O., the Court evaluated, for the first time, a school district’s
suspicionless search practice in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.335 There,
Vernonia School District implemented a random drug-testing program on students
participating in interscholastic sports in response to educators’ observations of a
sharp increase in student drug use led by student athletes. 336 James Acton, a wellbehaved seventh grader who did not have a drug problem, signed up to play football
at his school.337 School officials refused to allow James to participate because his
parents would not sign the drug-testing consent forms.338 The Actons sought to enjoin
enforcement of the school district’s random drug-testing policy on the grounds that
it violated the Fourth Amendment.339 In a 6–3 decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the school district’s policy.340
To determine whether the school district’s suspicionless search policy was
“reasonable” and comported with the Fourth Amendment, the Court balanced the
search’s “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”341 Accordingly, it established the
following three-factor framework, balancing (1) “the scope of the legitimate
expectation of privacy at issue” and (2) “the character of the intrusion that is
complained of” against (3) “the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern
at issue . . . and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.” 342
Applying these factors, the Court first acknowledged that students retain an
expectation of privacy while at school but explained that the scope of those rights are
“different” because of the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibilities. 343 The
Court reasoned that students’ expectation of privacy is reduced because they must
submit to various physical examinations, including vision, hearing, dental,
dermatological, and scoliosis screenings.344 The Court further explained that student

332. Id. at 337.
333. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
334. Id. at 343.
335. 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995).
336. Id. at 648–50.
337. Robert M. Bloom, The Story of Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls: Drug Testing
in the Public Schools, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 337, 346 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna
Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
338. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 651, 664–65.
341. Id. at 652–53.
342. Id. at 660.
343. Id. at 656.
344. Id.
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athletes have even lower expectations of privacy because they choose to participate
in athletic programs and commonly encounter conditions that provide less privacy
such as locker rooms.345
Second, the Court concluded that the “invasion of privacy” that the school
district’s random drug-testing policy imposed on students “was not significant.”346 It
explained that these searches were minimally intrusive because the drug testing
resembled conditions that students often face when using public restrooms, their
purpose was limited only to ascertain whether the student athlete was using drugs,
and the test results were disclosed only to a limited number of school officials, not
law enforcement officers.347
Third, the Court examined the “nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern” and the “the efficacy of th[e] means for meeting it.”348 The Court concluded
that the school district’s interest in deterring student drug use, especially among
student athletes, was important in light of the drugs’ physical, psychological, and
addictive effects.349 The Court also concluded that school district’s concern was
immediate, because “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved
in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion . . . [which] was being fueled
by alcohol and drug abuse.”350 According to the Court, these considerations
outweighed any privacy rights the students possessed.351
It is important to recognize the pronounced role that the school district’s
immediate and rampant drug problem played in the Court’s decision. Indeed, the
Court seemed to leave open the possibility that only a mere concern of students
potentially bringing drugs or weapons to campus would not justify intense
surveillance measures deemed to be highly intrusive, especially when school
authorities employ those measures on students who have greater expectations of
privacy than student athletes. Seven years later, however, the Court held otherwise.
In Board of Education v. Earls, a school district implemented a policy that
required middle and high school students to consent to random drug testing to be
eligible to participate in any extracurricular activities. 352 Following Vernonia, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that because the school
district had not demonstrated that there was an identifiable drug abuse problem
among students who participated in extracurricular activities, its policy violated the
Fourth Amendment.353 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Tenth Circuit
in a 5–4 decision.354

345. Id. at 657.
346. Id. at 660.
347. Id. at 658.
348. Id. at 660.
349. Id. at 661.
350. Id. at 662–63.
351. Id. at 661–62.
352. 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002).
353. Earl ex rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278
(10th Cir. 2001).
354. Earls, 536 U.S. at 824–25.
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The Court balanced the same three factors that it did in Vernonia and largely
reached the same conclusions.355 While the Court noted that the school district
“presented specific evidence of drug use,”356 it held that the school district was not
required to provide evidence of a drug abuse problem before imposing a
suspicionless drug-testing policy.357 The Court upheld the program because “the
nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every
school.”358
This broad holding provided ample constitutional leeway for school authorities to
conduct a sweeping array of suspicionless search practices without first having to
provide evidence of a drug or weapons problem. As a result of this movement in the
law, lower courts have upheld the use of a variety of random, suspicionless search
practices in schools such as using metal detectors,359 searching students’ lockers,360
conducting random sweeps for contraband,361 using drug-sniffing dogs,362 and
monitoring students with surveillance cameras.363 Moreover, there are no protections
against school officials’ use of a combination of these surveillance measures, even
when their cumulative use creates an intense, prisonlike environment inconsistent
with a healthy learning atmosphere.
Furthermore, this broad constitutional discretion with little accountability has
provided fertile conditions for implicit racial biases to unduly influence school
officials’ decision-making on whether to employ intense surveillance measures in
schools. Indeed, as demonstrated above, not all school officials choose to employ

355. Id. at 830–38.
356. Id. at 834.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009);
In re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 886–87 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316,
319–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 1999).
360. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003); In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d
405, 414–15 (Md. 2000); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993). Nevertheless, there
is disagreement among courts regarding whether students retain an expectation of privacy in
their lockers. See Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra note 1, at 411–12.
361. See, e.g., In re Daniel A., No. B232404, 2012 WL 2126539, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June
13, 2012).
362. See, e.g., Sims v. Bracken Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 10-33-DLB, 2010 WL 4103167, at
*13–19 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2010); Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 616 F. Supp. 2d
184, 192 (D.N.H. 2009). However, dog sniffs on students’ persons has caused a sharp division
among courts. Compare Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(upholding random, suspicionless dog sniffs on students’ persons), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), with B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,
192 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a suspicionless dog sniff on a student was
unconstitutional because, as “the body and its odors are highly personal,” dog sniffs on a
person’s body are “highly intrusive”).
363. See, e.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Videotaping of
suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”).
However, courts do not uphold surreptitious video surveillance of students in locations such
as bathrooms or locker rooms. See Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499–
500 (6th Cir. 2008).
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such harsh monitoring tactics to induce order and control. 364 Rather, the empirical
evidence demonstrates that schools with higher concentrations of minority students
more often rely on these intense measures, and the evidence suggests that these
decisions are not justified by immediate safety concerns. 365
V. A REFORMULATED FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The use of extreme surveillance measures, especially when applied
disproportionately to minority students, delegitimizes the educational process, harms
students’ interests, furthers racial inequalities, weakens trust in government
institutions, skews minorities’ perceptions of their standing in our society, and sends
harmful messages to everyone that students attending majority-white schools have
greater privileges and superior privacy rights. 366 In addition, while one might try to
justify these disparities on the basis that majority-minority schools often confront
greater safety concerns, the empirical evidence demonstrates that racial disparities
exist after accounting for factors such as school crime, neighborhood crime, and
school disorder, suggesting that other factors—such as implicit racial bias—also
influence decision-making.367 This is a problem our nation needs to address.
I have argued at length elsewhere that school-led reform is the most effective way
to address the overreliance on intense surveillance measures and their
disproportionate use on students of color.368 It is critical to recognize that there are
more effective, pedagogically sound measures to address school violence and
promote safe learning environments than intense surveillance measures. 369 I have
also argued that federal and state agencies should stop providing money for coercive
security measures and instead support and establish incentives for schools to
implement these alternative initiatives. 370 In addition, I have recommended that the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights become more active in
addressing the disproportionate use of coercive security measures in majorityminority schools.371 Further, I have argued that schools should provide, and federal
and state agencies should support, training to help school officials and teachers
address their implicit racial biases. 372 Such training will help educators make more

364. See supra notes 282–90.
365. See supra Part II.
366. See supra Part III.
367. See supra Part II.
368. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 48–55; see also Jason P. Nance,
School Security Considerations after Newtown, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 108–09 (2013).
369. See supra notes 283–287 and accompanying text; see also Nance, supra note 47 at
345–60.
370. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 55. Importantly, the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights recently recommended that schools use
these approaches to create safe school climates. See GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 246, at
5–7; see also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 195, at app. 2.
371. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 1, at 55.
372. See Nance, supra note 47, at 367–69; Jason P. Nance, Over-Disciplining Students,
Racial Bias, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2016);
Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 1, at
831–37.
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equitable decisions and interact with all student groups in more equitable manners. I
continue to support these recommendations.
However, courts also have an important and unique role to play in addressing this
problem. In fact, courts are uniquely situated to address this issue in a way that school
authorities cannot. When political trends or emotionally charged events cause
government actors to make decisions that threaten core constitutional rights and
values, courts have a responsibility to establish clear constitutional guidelines for
government officials to follow. This is particularly important in the context of public
education because, as Kevin Brown observes, “public schools are social institutions
that cultivate America’s youth.”373 In fact, courts repeatedly have held that schools
are charged with the responsibility of inculcating our children with the constitutional
values that undergird our nation.374 Accordingly, once courts delineate a clear
standard for schools to follow—one that will shore up students’ Fourth Amendment
rights and better protect them against the consequences of implicit racial bias—
school officials will be more motivated to address school safety in a more
pedagogically sound manner.
Before discussing the reformulated Fourth Amendment test in the school context,
it is important to explain that neither the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 currently provides students
with adequate recourse to address this problem. In Washington v. Davis and the cases
that follow that decision, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that to establish a
violation under the Equal Protection Clause, one cannot rely solely on the fact that a
government law or policy has a racially disproportionate impact.375 Rather, plaintiffs
must have independent evidence that government officials acted with discriminatory
intent.376 Furthermore, as Darren Hutchinson has explained, even if implicit racial
bias influences school officials’ acts, implicit racial bias “takes place outside of the
conscious intent of the actor.”377 Thus, “even if the defendant’s conduct is intentional
. . . [t]he discriminatory intent rule . . . makes arguments regarding nonconscious bias
irrelevant.”378 While many scholars have argued that courts should take implicit

373. Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1992).
374. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373–74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of
rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry.”); Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022,
1027–28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Schools cannot expect
their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves
disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms.”); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“[T]hat [schools] are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”).
375. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (concluding that disparate impact may be an
“important starting point,” disparate impact by itself “is not determinative”).
376. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
377. Hutchinson, supra note 52, at 43.
378. Id.
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racial biases into account when deciding Equal Protection claims, 379 establishing
conscious discriminatory intent is still the standard plaintiffs must meet. 380
Likewise, Title VI and its administrative regulations may provide students with
little recourse in this context. Title VI and its accompanying regulations provide the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) with the authority to
prohibit public schools from implementing facially neutral policies that have a
disparate impact on students of color.381 However, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the
Court held that individuals may not bring a private right of action to enforce the
OCR’s regulations.382 Although the OCR continues to investigate and enforce
disparate impact claims,383 one significant enforcement challenge in this context is
that despite the fact that, overall, students of color are disproportionately subjected
to extreme surveillance measures, a potential complainant may not be able to identify
a district or school policy that has a disparate impact on an identifiable racial group
because many times all of the students in the classroom, school, or district are subject
to the same harsh conditions.384
Thus, I turn to a solution under the Fourth Amendment. The current framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of random, suspicionless searches of students is a
balancing test. On one side of the scale are the students’ Fourth Amendment interests,
expressed specifically by the U.S. Supreme Court as (1) “the scope of the legitimate
expectation of privacy at issue” and (2) “the character of the intrusion that is
complained of.” On the other side of the scale are the governmental interests,
specifically expressed by the Court as (3) “the nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern at issue . . . and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.” 385

379. E.g., Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 401, 442–46 (2010)
(arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should take into account the racial identifiability and
culture meaning of spaces); Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 325, 333 (2014) (“[M]any of our municipal and other boundaries are subject
to Equal Protection challenge, contra the intent requirement . . . because they support [racial]
stigma . . . by propping up . . . inequalities.”); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)
(“[R]equiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional
recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how
the human mind words.”).
380. Hutchinson, supra note 52, at 43 n.122.
381. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2013) (stating that recipient of federal funds may not
“utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”).
382. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
383. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 195, at 11 (“Schools also violate Federal
law when they evenhandedly implement facially neutral policies and practices that, although
not adopted with the intent to discriminate, nonetheless have an unjustified effect of
discriminating against students on the basis of race. The resulting discriminatory effect is
commonly referred to as ‘disparate impact.’”).
384. See Daniel J. Losen & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Role of Law in Policing Abusive
Disciplinary Practices: Why School Discipline Is a Civil Rights Issue, in ZERO TOLERANCE:
RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS; A HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS,
STUDENTS, EDUCATORS, AND CITIZENS 237 (2001).
385. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 558, 660 (1995).
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Critically, my reformulated framework does not call for a complete overhaul of this
balancing test. Rather, I seek to expand courts’ understanding of the factors
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, thus recalibrating the balancing test in light
of the current realities that many students face. Further, by adopting this test, courts
will ameliorate the pernicious effects of implicit racial bias and be instrumental in
promoting more just and inclusive educational environments for all students.
A. Rethink the Concept of “Nature and Immediacy
of the Governmental Concern”
First, I propose that courts rethink how they evaluate “the nature and immediacy
of the governmental concern” prong in light of what the empirical and scientific
evidence teaches us about how school officials may make decisions about school
security.386 In Vernonia, the Court held that the governmental interest must be
“important enough” to justify the search practice,387 and it concluded that deterring
drug use by students was indeed important. 388 The Court reaffirmed this holding in
Earls.389 What the implicit social cognition science reveals, however, is that working
in a school with a high concentration of students of color can trigger implicit racial
biases, which affect school officials’ perceptions, behaviors, actions, and decisions
regarding how to create orderly environments. 390 This is because school officials may
unconsciously associate students of color with danger, crime, aggression, disorder,
and violence.391 Empirical studies examining the use of school security measures
bear this out. Specifically, the empirical studies reveal that even after controlling for
school characteristic and student demographic variables such as school crime, school

386. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1002–03
(2006); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2035–36 (2011) (“Behavioral realist scholars argue that judges should not base their
theories of human behavior on a purely conceptual, a priori process, but rather on the best
empirical scientific evidence that exists.”). A modification to align the constitutional rights of
youth with our current understanding of social science is not unprecedented in the case law.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (using social science to justify the
decision to prohibit a sentence that mandated life in prison without parole for juvenile
offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (using social science to justify the
decision to prohibit a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders who commit crimes
other than homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005) (using social science
to justify prohibiting the death penalty for a juvenile offender); In re Gault, 377 U.S. 1, 57–59
(1967) (deciding to extend additional procedural protections to juveniles in light of the
evidence that courts failed to provide juveniles with benevolent protection); Barry C. Feld,
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham,
Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQ. 263, 264, 277–92 (2013); Catherine Y.
Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863 (2012).
387. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (emphasis omitted).
388. Id. at 661–62.
389. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 882,
834 (2002).
390. See supra Part I.
391. See supra Part I.
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disorder, and neighborhood crime, the percentage of minority students attending the
school is still positively related to school officials’ decisions to implement tighter
security measures.392 And the race of the students, in and of itself, should never be
the basis for sustaining a legitimate governmental interest for invading students’
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
Accordingly, to ameliorate the pernicious effects of implicit bias, I propose that
courts conduct a more rigorous review of the “nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern” prong by requiring school districts to provide objective,
tangible evidence of safety concerns to justify their reliance on intense surveillance
measures.393 This will compel school officials to ensure that their decisions to rely
on intense security measures are not based on the illegitimate criteria of race
(consciously or unconsciously), but on objective, measurable criteria such as
evidence that students are actually bringing contraband to school.
Importantly, this approach is consistent with the Court’s analysis in Vernonia.
There, the Court upheld the school district’s suspicionless drug policy, at least in
part, because “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion . . . [and] the rebellion was being
fueled by alcohol and drug abuse.” 394 This also was the approach the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed in Doe v. Little Rock School District.395 In
Little Rock, as part of Little Rock School District’s routine practice of subjecting
students to random, suspicionless searches, school officials ordered Jane Doe and her
classmates to remove everything from their pockets, put their purses and backpacks
on their desks, and leave the classroom. 396 While the students waited in the hallway,
school officials used metal detectors to scan students’ bodies, then searched by hand
through students’ belongings left behind in the classroom. 397 The Eighth Circuit held

392. See supra Part II.
393. Notably, several courts have considered the effects of implicit racial bias, especially
in the selection of jurors. See, e.g., G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson 116 F. Supp.
3d 126, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The intersection of [conscious, unconscious, or implicit] bias
in civil rights and criminal cases exacerbates common stereotypes and reinforces long-held
prejudices.”); Ohio v. Sherman, No. 97840, 2012 WL 3765041, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)
(Steward, P.J., concurring) (“I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to call
attention to the role that implicit associations might play in sentencing disparities . . . .”).
Additionally, a District of Arizona judge ordered a sheriff’s department to revise its training
protocol to include debiasing techniques. Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV–07–02513–PHX–
GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *14–15 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 784 F.3d
1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The Training . . . shall address or include, at a minimum: . . . the
existence of arbitrary classifications, stereotypes, and implicit bias . . . .”). U.S. District Court
Judge Mark Bennett routinely explains to jury members the concept of implicit racial implicit
bias and admonishes jurors not to rely of those biases. Cynthia Lee, Awareness as a First Step
Toward Overcoming Implicit Bias, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 289, 291–92
(Sarah Redfield ed., 2017).
394. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1995).
395. 380 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 2004).
396. Id. at 351.
397. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 4:99CV00386, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26439, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 2003).
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that the school district’s practice violated the Fourth Amendment.398 It reasoned that
these search practices amounted to a significant invasion of students’ privacy
interests, and the school district had not demonstrated that its concerns were
“immediate” because the school district had failed to provide evidence that drugs and
weapons were an actual problem in the school.399 The school district merely relied
on the fact that students could possibly bring contraband to school.
This approach also is consistent with frameworks proposed by scholars who study
the effects of implicit racial bias on law enforcement searches of the general public.
For example, for years L. Song Richardson has studied the effects of implicit racial
bias on police officers’ decisions to conduct stop-and-frisk searches on
disproportionate numbers of African Americans,400 despite the fact that stop-andfrisk searches on whites more often yield incriminating evidence. 401 Richardson
argues that we should return to the probable cause standard as the only justification
for stop-and-frisk searches, which would require police “to gather more information
and to observe more unambiguous behavior before seizing individuals.” 402
Richardson further argues that courts should not automatically defer to police
officers’ judgments about criminality to determine whether a reasonable suspicion
exists.403 Rather, courts should require police officers to produce empirically
validated evidence in support of their inferences instead of relying solely “upon an
officer’s personal experiences or common-sense conclusions, which the science
demonstrates are often incorrect.”404 In other words, similar to my proposed
framework, Richardson’s modifications would compel government officials to
produce objective, measurable evidence to support their decisions instead of simply
assuming that government officials are acting in an objective, unbiased way that is
in the students’ best interests.
In addition, this approach is more consistent with sound educational policy and
pedagogy. As explained more fully above, schools’ overreliance on intense

398. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 356–57.
399. Id.; see also Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100, 1109 (D.
Minn. 2009) (holding that random, suspicionless searches of students’ belongings violated the
Fourth Amendment because the school could not demonstrate that these searches were
necessary to maintain an orderly, safe environment). It bears noting that most of the students
attending Little Rock School District in Little Rock, Arkansas, are students of color. See Little
Rock School District Directory Information, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.,
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/districtsearch/district_detail.asp?ID2=0509000
[https://perma.cc
/Z72Z-ZB7L].
400. See Richardson, supra note 386, at 2035; L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police
Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267 (2012); Richardson, supra note
52, at 1143.
401. Richardson, supra note 386, at 2037, 2040.
402. Id. at 2076.
403. Id. at 2077.
404. Id. at 2079; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles
to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 31–32 (2010) (proposing that courts should not defer to “officer hunches,
instincts, and bare reliance on generalizations” to uphold stop-and-frisk searches, but require
officers to produce “suspect-specific evidence of individual wrongdoing” because of cognitive
biases).
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surveillance measures does not foster positive learning climates, but can lead to
distrust, discord, dysfunction, and destabilization.405 This is especially true when
students perceive intrusions into their privacy as unfair and unfounded. 406
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the pedagogical principle that
surveillance measures should be as minimal as the circumstances call for. Bryan
Warnick cogently explains that intense surveillance measures “should only be used
when there is evidence of a clear and immediate danger to student safety or to the
conditions necessary for student learning.” 407 He further maintains that school
authorities should rely on these measures only after other measures have failed, and
that school authorities should discontinue their use once the problem that led to their
usage has been addressed.408 By following these principles, “violations of privacy
are limited to protecting against real problems and existing threats.” 409
B. Rethink the Concept of “Intrusion”
Second, with respect to the other side of the Court’s balancing equation, I propose
that courts rethink the concepts of “intrusion” when evaluating random, suspicionless
searches in schools in a manner that is more consistent with how courts evaluate
violations of constitutional rights in other areas, including Fourth Amendment rights
outside of the school context. As of now, courts routinely uphold, as a matter of law,
the use of metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and random searches of students’
lockers and personal belongings on the basis that these searches are “minimally
intrusive” to students’ expectations of privacy. 410 However, when reaching this
conclusion, courts tend to evaluate these practices in isolation and fail to take into
account the broader context of the surveillance environment, which can amount to a
significant intrusion of students’ privacy and dignity interests, both of which are
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. 411
For example, in In re Daniel A., a campus supervisor entered a classroom and
demanded that all students stand and empty the contents of their bags on their desks,
pursuant to the school’s random search policy. 412 Daniel argued that the suspicionless

405. See supra Section III.A.
406. See supra Section III.A (explaining that when individuals perceive intrusions into
their privacy as unfair and unjustified, they become resentful and less willing to comply with
laws and policies).
407. WARNICK, supra note 209, at 162.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. E.g., Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009); In
re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 886–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361,
366 (Pa. 1999); see, e.g., State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003); In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405, 414–15
(Md. 2000); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993).
411. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613 (1989) (observing that
the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons”); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
412. No. B232404, 2012 WL 2126539, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2012).
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search of his backpack was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 413 The
California Appeals Court concluded that the school official did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, focusing exclusively on the single search of Daniel’s backpack and
concluding that this intrusion of Daniel’s privacy interest was “minimal.” 414
However, the California Appeals Court failed to fully appreciate or take into account
altogether that Daniel’s high school regularly searched students’ belongings, even
when they were not suspected of engaging in wrongdoing, regularly relied on metal
detectors, regularly relied on harsh zero tolerance policies, and regularly relied on
police officers to monitor and maintain control of students.415 If the court had viewed
the broader context of the surveillance environment (or permitted the factfinder to
take the broader context into consideration), it very well could have (and should
have) determined that the school’s cumulative surveillance practices amounted to
much more than a “minimal” intrusion of students’ privacy and dignity rights.
Indeed, a far more appropriate, fair, and accurate approach to evaluate the
character of the intrusion is to examine the cumulative effect that all of the security
measures have on students’ privacy and dignity interests, rather than evaluating each
measure in isolation. In other words, when students routinely, even daily, are
subjected to a combination of surveillance measures that include metal detectors,
locked gates, police officers, surveillance cameras, random locker searches, drug
sniffing dogs, random pat downs, and random searches through their personal
belongings,416 the cumulative effect of these intense, coercive measures can amount
to a significant intrusion of students’ privacy and personal dignity interests, even
when an individual practice, when viewed in isolation, might be considered
“minimally intrusive.”417 Such a test more closely aligns with how students actually
experience these privacy and dignity intrusions. This approach also more closely
aligns with the “totality of the circumstances” evaluation the Court applies in so
many other areas of the law. 418
Surely Edward Ward, who attended a school where all of his classmates were
students of color and almost all were poor, would not consider the privacy and dignity
intrusions that he and his classmates faced each day to be “minimal.” As described
above, he compared his daily school experience to what one experiences in a
prison.419 Edward recalled that “[f]rom the moment we stepped through the doors in
the morning, we were faced with metal detectors, x-ray machines and uniformed
security. Upon entering the school, it was like we stepped into a prison.”420 He
observed that the “halls were full with school security officers whose only purpose
seemed to be to serve students with detentions or suspensions.” 421 The affront to

413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See Guidelines and Policies: Conduct at School Activities, MORNINGSIDE HIGH
SCHOOL,
http://mhs.myiusd.net/students-parents/guide-lines/
[https://perma.cc/M24Y
-SDU5].
416. See supra notes 15–38 and accompanying text for examples of such schools.
417. See supra note 411.
418. See infra notes 427–37 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
420. Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 35, at 1.
421. Id. at 3.
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personal dignity is even more egregious when one considers that, more often than
not, it is students attending majority-minority schools in impoverished areas who are
routinely treated in this manner.422
Or consider the daily experiences of students attending a New Orleans high
school, where each morning students passed through metal detectors monitored by
police officers, and security guards rummaged through students’ personal bags. 423 If
the guards discovered cell phones, belts with certain buckles, or oversized jewelry,
they confiscated them.424 Students who triggered the metal detectors three times were
sometimes sent home, even when the guards could not discover any contraband. 425
Certain days, students who were not in the classrooms by 9 a.m. were locked out,
pushed into an auditorium by guards, and then suspended.426 Certainly those students
would not consider these intrusions into their privacy and dignity as “minimal.”
This broader, holistic approach to evaluating the “totality of the circumstances”
or the “cumulative effect” of certain conditions is pervasive within Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, to decide whether consent to a search was
voluntary or the result of coercion or duress, the Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
observed that this was “a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances,” taking various factors into consideration that include age, education,
intelligence level, length of detention, the nature of the questioning, and use of
physical punishment.427 The Court emphasized that the case should not be
determined by “the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion”; rather, the
result of the case should reflect “a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances.”428 Similarly, when evaluating whether a police officer had probable
cause to conduct a search, the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida v. Harris explained,
“we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances. We have rejected
rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible,
all-things-considered approach.”429 Indeed, even in the seminal student search case
of T.L.O. v. New Jersey, the Court observed that “what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place.”430
This holistic approach of evaluating the “totality of the circumstances” or the
“cumulative effect” of certain conditions is common in other areas of constitutional

422. One must also not forget that, as opposed to other places the public frequents that have
high security, such as airports, youth are compelled to attend school, see Table 5.1.
Compulsory School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for Required Free
Education, by State: 2017, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs
/statereform/tab5_1.asp [https://perma.cc/8X3N-JKZZ], and oftentimes students, because of
their family’s circumstances, do not have a realistic option to attend another school that does
not rely on intense surveillance measures.
423. See Ellen Tuzzolo & Damon T. Hewitt, Rebuilding Inequity: The Re-Emergency of
the School-to-Prison Pipeline in New Orleans, 90 HIGH SCH. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 59, 66 (2007).
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. 412 U.S. 218, 226–28 (1973).
428. Id. at 226.
429. 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2017) (citation omitted).
430. 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (emphasis added).
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jurisprudence as well. For example, in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the
Court determined that a Texas statute requiring doctors who performed abortions to
have active admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the site of the
abortion posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.431 That regulation
led to the closing of half of Texas’ abortion clinics. 432 In its holding, the Court
reasoned that the increased driving distances, in and of itself, did not always amount
to an “undue burden.”433 However, that burden, “when taken together with others
that the closings brought about,” such as “fewer doctors, longer waiting time, and
increased crowding,” led the Court to conclude that the Texas regulation created an
undue burden on women’s rights. 434 Likewise, in the Fifth Amendment context, in
order to determine whether a person is “in police custody,” such that the person
would be entitled to receive Miranda warnings before being questioned by the police,
the Court examines “‘all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,’
including any circumstances that ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in
the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’” 435 Courts further
apply the “cumulative effect” or “totality of the circumstances” analyses when
evaluating whether there was an unfair trial that amounted to a denial of due
process,436 and whether detention following an arrest constituted a violation of
substantive due process.437
Indeed, the pervasiveness of this approach in other areas of constitutional
jurisprudence, including in other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, causes
one to question why courts do not undertake a broader evaluation of the entire
surveillance environment when examining the “intrusiveness” of a search conducted
by school authorities. This is especially troublesome because such an analysis would
be more closely aligned with how students actually experience these privacy and
dignity intrusions. Appropriately considering the severity and intensity of the entire
surveillance environment would place more weight in favor of a constitutional
violation under the current Fourth Amendment framework in many cases and would
more effectively safeguard students’ right to be free from unjustified invasions of
their privacy interests.

431. 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2310, 2313 (2016).
432. Id. at 2313.
433. Id.
434. Id. (emphasis added).
435. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270–71 (2011) (quoting Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 218, 322, 325 (1994)); see also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
436. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (“[T]he failure to give a requested
instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violation the Constitution
. . . . [S]uch a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances—including
all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence
was overwhelming, and other relevant factors . . . .”).
437. Luckes v. Cty. of Hennipin, 415 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In determining
whether extended detention following an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant violates substantive
due process . . . we look to the totality of the circumstances.”).
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CONCLUSION
The proposed recalibration of the current legal framework for evaluating
suspicionless search practices in schools is an important step forward to creating
more equitable and inclusive academic environments for all of our nation’s youth. It
would help ameliorate the pernicious effects of implicit racial bias, address the
unequal use of intense surveillance measures on students of color, and motivate
school officials to rely on alternative, evidence-based measures that more effectively
foster safe environments without harming the learning climate. 438 The reformulated
test also is more consistent with the broader purposes of Fourth Amendment doctrine
and good educational policy and practice.
Over one hundred years ago, the wise philosopher and reformer John Dewey
astutely observed that “[w]hat the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that
must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is
narrow and unlovely; acted upon it destroys our democracy.” 439 In some of our
nation’s schools, including schools serving children living in challenging
environments, students view their experiences to be too important to risk suspension
and expulsion and too precious to be spoiled by crime and violence.440 These schools
have an ethos of belonging and trust. 441 Children desire to attend these schools
because they feel part of a special community—a community that cares for one
another and desires the best for one another.442 These are the types of schools that
make real differences in children’s lives and prepare them to be happy and
productive. We owe it to our nation’s children to strive to create these types of
learning environments for all students. They deserve nothing less.

438. See Nance, supra note 47, at 345–62.
439. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 19 (1900).
440. See Michael Powell, In a School Built on Trust, Metal Detectors Inject Fear, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/nyregion/in-a-brooklyn-school
-metal-detectors-inject-fear.html [https://perma.cc/3N8H-L527].
441. Id.
442. Id.

